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A b s t r a c t 	The	 thesis	 through	a	 small-N	comparative	 study	of	 ISIS	and	AQIM,	analyzes	how	 terrorist	organizations	interact	with	external	societies	to	increase	attractiveness	and	recruit	foreign	support.	 A	 modified	 version	 of	 Gilboa’s	 non-state	 actor	 model	 of	 public	 diplomacy	intertwined	 with	 notions	 of	 constructivism	 is	 applied	 to	 determine	 how	 branding,	communication,	and	soft	power	foster	common	identities	and	amplify	patronage	for	jihadist	groups.	 To	 this	 date,	 limited	 research	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 the	 strategic	 use	 of	 public	diplomacy	 by	 terrorist	 organizations.	 In	 fact,	 the	 link	 between	 jihadist	 groups	 and	 public	diplomacy	 appears	 to	 be	 almost	 entirely	 nonexistent.	 Thus,	 the	 thesis	 addresses	 the	knowledge	 gap	 by	 answering	 the	 research	 question:	 how	 do	 terrorist	 organizations	 go	about	 attracting	 foreign	 support	 via	 public	 diplomacy?	 The	 study	 analyzes	 the	 public	diplomacy	strategies	implemented	by	ISIS	and	AQIM	and	the	role	the	instrument	played	in	the	recent	terrorist	attacks	in	France,	Belgium,	Burkina	Faso	and	Ivory	Coast.	ISIS	and	AQIM	are	 selected	 as	 case	 studies	 due	 to	 varying	 considerably	 in	 their	 organizational	 makeup.	Whilst	 ISIS	 is	 an	 internationally	 focused	 group,	AQIM	 consists	 of	 a	 regional	 faction	of	 the	larger	 al-Qaeda	organization.	Techniques	of	process	 tracing	 combined	with	discourse	and	content	analysis	are	employed	to	uncover	how	the	groups	differ	 in	their	public	diplomacy	strategies	 and	 capabilities.	 To	 do	 so,	 primary	 and	 secondary	 sources	 including	 scholarly	literature,	 recruitment	videos,	 interviews,	news	articles	 and	 social	media	publications	are	explored.	 The	 findings	 demonstrate	 that	 international	 terrorist	 groups	 like	 ISIS	 make	significantly	more	use	of	social	media	 to	recruit	support	worldwide.	 In	comparison,	AQIM	appears	 to	be	experiencing	difficulty	 in	operating	virtual	platforms,	 resulting	 in	 its	public	diplomacy	 centering	predominantly	on	direct	 interaction	with	populations	 residing	 in	 the	neighborhood.	Consequently,	the	public	diplomacy	exerted	by	ISIS	is	deemed	more	capable	of	mobilizing	foreign	support.		
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1 . 	 I n t r o d u c t i o n 	Merely	four	months	after	the	deadly	terrorist	assaults	on	several	locations	in	Paris,	bombs	packed	 with	 nails	 exploded	 in	 Zaventum	 airport	 and	 the	 Maelbeek	 metro	 station	 in	Brussels,	 indiscriminately	 targeting	 civilians	 (Breeden,	 Raghavan	 &	 Rubin,	 2016).	 The	coordinated	 strikes	 in	 Paris	 and	Brussels	 perpetrated	 by	 the	 Islamic	 State	 of	 Iraq	 and	 al-Sham	 (ISIS)	 highlights	 the	 existential	 threat	 faced	 by	 the	 West	 from	 militant	 extremist	groups.	Similarly,	gunman	stormed	Ouagadougou’s	Splendid	Hotel	and	nearby	Cappuccino	Café	in	Burkina	Faso	(BBC	News,	2016).	Less	than	a	month	later,	armed	men	opened	fired	on	civilians	at	a	beach	resort	in	the	Ivorian	coastal	town	of	Grand	Bassam.	Al-Qaeda	in	the	Islamic	 Maghreb	 (AQIM)	 claimed	 responsibility	 for	 both	 devastating	 incidents	 (Kajee,	2016).	 Whilst	 AQIM	 specifically	 targeted	 locations	 frequented	 by	 foreign	 nationals,	 ISIS	spread	terror	on	European	soil,	including	in	the	heart	of	the	European	Union.	Consequently,	ISIS	 and	 AQIM	 ignited	 immense	 fear	 in	 the	 international	 community	 through	 launching	violent	attacks	on	foreign	soil	and	civilians.	
The	 recent	 attacks	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 transnational	 threat	 posed	 by	 terrorism	 is	more	imminent	today	than	ever	before.	Jihadist	organizations	are	able	to	recruit	support	from	all	corners	of	 the	 globe	and	 cause	 significant	harm	 through	unexpected	acts	of	 terrorism.	As	such,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	 understand	 both	 how	 and	 why	 terrorist	 groups	 are	 capable	 of	gaining	 vast	 patronage	 from	 foreign	 publics,	 permitting	 them	 to	 increase	 their	 sphere	 of	influence,	 secure	 manpower	 and	 mobilize	 attacks.	 ISIS	 has	 developed	 a	 notorious	reputation	 for	 recruiting	 foreign	 support	 and	 fighters	 by	 communicating	 with	 young	Muslims	worldwide	via	social	media.	Likewise,	online	platforms	are	increasingly	utilized	by	al-Qaeda	to	promote	Islamic	fundamentalist	values	and	increase	the	attractiveness	of	their	cause.	Hence,	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	non-state	actors	are	 strategically	 implementing	public	diplomacy	 to	 promote	 extremist	Muslim	 values	 and	 interact	 with	 foreign	 audiences.	 The	tactical	 use	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 by	 jihadist	 groups	 raises	 several	 profound	 questions;	mainly,	 to	 what	 extent	 do	 terrorist	 organizations	 use	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 increase	 their	attractiveness	abroad?	What	public	diplomacy	tactics	do	terrorist	organizations	implement	to	interact	with	foreign	audiences?	How	is	social	media	employed	to	extend	the	reach	of	the	public	diplomacy?	Are	there	differences	in	how	ISIS	and	AQIM	use	public	diplomacy?	Which	tactics	 appear	 to	 be	 most	 attractive	 to	 foreign	 audiences?	 The	 thesis	 targets	 the	
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abovementioned	 inquiries	 by	 answering	 the	 overarching	 research	 question,	 how	 do	terrorist	organizations	go	about	attracting	foreign	support	via	public	diplomacy?		
Public	 diplomacy	 is	 defined	 as	 “an	 instrument	 used	 by	 states,	 associations	 of	 states,	 and	some	sub-state	and	non-state	actors	 to	understand	cultures,	attitudes	and	behavior;	build	and	 manage	 relationships;	 and	 influence	 thoughts	 and	 mobilize	 actions	 to	 advance	 their	interests	and	values”	(Gregory,	2011:	353).	Although	the	concept	of	public	diplomacy	itself	is	 not	 entirely	 novel,	 limited	 research	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 how	 terrorists	 use	 the	instrument	 to	 disseminate	 their	 values	 and	 further	 their	 interests.	 Previous	 research	centers	 on	 how	 states	 utilize	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 target	 terrorist	 organizations	 in	 their	home	 country	 rather	 than	 how	 jihadists	 themselves	 employ	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 extend	their	zone	of	influence.	In	fact,	the	notion	of	diplomacy	itself	is	rarely	associated	with	non-state	actors,	especially	terrorist	organizations.	
A	 fine	 line	 distinguishes	 public	 diplomacy	 from	 traditional	 diplomacy,	 namely	 in	 the	targeted	 population.	Whilst	 traditional	 diplomacy	 revolves	 around	 relationships	 between	formal	representatives	of	the	state	or	international	organizations,	public	diplomacy	instead	emphasizes	 general	 publics	 in	 foreign	 societies	 (Melissen,	 2005:	 5).	 As	 jihadist	organizations	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	more	 capable	 of	 interacting	with	 foreign	 publics	and	fostering	homegrown	terrorism	through	the	development	of	sophisticated	technology,	the	potential	of	these	non-state	actors	to	use	public	diplomacy	as	a	tactic	is	enhanced.	This	study	fills	the	knowledge	gap	by	establishing	a	concrete	link	between	the	goals	of	terrorist	groups	to	spread	Islamic	fundamentalist	values	and	public	diplomacy.		
The	 absence	 of	 an	 explicit	 link	 between	 public	 diplomacy	 and	 terrorist	 organizations	 in	previous	 research	 raises	 the	concern	whether	 the	actions	 taken	by	 these	non-state	actors	can	 actually	 qualify	 as	 public	 diplomacy.	 The	 techniques	 used	 to	 promote	 Islamic	fundamentalist	 values	 are	 not	 strictly	 propaganda	 nor	 are	 the	 jihadist	 organizations	lobbying	 their	 cause.	 Rather,	 terrorist	 organizations	 engage	 in	 dialogue	 with	 a	 targeted	external	 population	 in	 hopes	 to	 mobilize	 support.	 Interaction	 is	 increasingly	 conducted	through	social	media,	defined	as	websites	that	facilitate	communication	and	the	sharing	of	values,	 ideas,	 images	 and	 information.	 The	 thesis	 makes	 the	 case	 that	 the	 recruitment	efforts	of	jihadist	groups	qualify	as	public	diplomacy	if	the	concept	is	modified	to	include	a	new	range	of	actors	with	differing	motives.	Additionally,	 the	thesis	updates	current	public	
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diplomacy	 thinking	 to	 account	 for	 recent	 technological	 innovations	 that	 permit	 jihadist	groups	to	influence	public	opinion	in	external	societies.				
The	thesis	examines	the	public	diplomacy	strategies	exerted	by	both	ISIS	and	AQIM.	These	two	 non-state	 actors	 are	 selected	 due	 to	 diverging	 considerably	 in	 their	 organizational	makeup.	 According	 to	 Bari-Atwan	 (Chatham	 House,	 2015:	 4),	 ISIS	 varies	 from	 other	terrorist	 organizations,	 because	 it	 comprises	 state-like	 capabilities.	 Not	 only	 is	 the	 group	financially	 self-sufficient,	 as	 it	 maintains	 land,	 oil	 and	 gas	 fields,	 the	 organization	 has	 a	stable	 home	 base.	 Additionally,	 ISIS	 accentuates	 a	 globalist	 approach	 through	 a	 powerful	online	 presence	 and	media	 campaign,	 earning	 the	 title	 ‘masters	 of	 the	 digital	 age’	 (Ibid.).	Contrarily,	 AQIM	 is	 the	 North	 African	 branch	 of	 the	 greater	 al-Qaeda	 organization.	 As	 a	result,	 the	 group	 is	 dependent	 on	 al-Qaeda	 financing,	 fundraising	 via	 trafficking	 of	contrabands	or	kidnapping	for	ransom.	Moreover,	AQIM	harbors	in	the	outskirts	of	several	sovereign	 states	 in	 the	 region	 and	 appears	 to	 have	 a	 less	 lively	 presence	 online	 (Counter	Extremism	Project,	2016).	The	groups	also	deviate	 in	 tactics,	whilst	AQIM	uses	a	 ‘hit-and-run’	 style	 of	 revenge	 against	 the	West;	 ISIS	 instead	 conquers	 land	 from	 its	 enemies	 and	expands	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 caliphate	 (Chatham	 House,	 2015:	 4).	 Interestingly,	 both	organizations	 established	 a	 specialized	 media	 wing	 responsible	 for	 diffusing	 messages,	insinuating	the	importance	of	public	diplomacy	to	the	groups.	The	analysis	of	ISIS	and	AQIM	juxtaposes	internationalized	terrorist	organizations	to	geographically	concentrated	ones.		
To	 analyze	 how	 jihadist	 organizations	 advantageously	 make	 use	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 to	attract	 foreign	 support,	 the	 first	 section	 of	 the	 thesis	 provides	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 what	public	diplomacy	entails	and	to	what	extent	the	actions	of	terrorist	organizations	suffice	as	public	diplomacy.	The	second	section	situates	the	promotion	of	Islamic	fundamentalism	by	jihadist	 groups	 in	 previously	 conducted	 research.	 The	 literature	 review	 confirms	 the	novelty	 of	 the	 topic	 at	 hand,	 whilst	 simultaneously	 identifying	 vital	 factors	 leading	 to	radicalization	 and	 support	 for	 extremist	 values.	 The	 third	 section	 outlines	 the	 theoretical	framework,	 which	 includes	 a	 revised	 version	 of	 Gilboa’s	 non-state	 actor	 model	 of	 public	diplomacy,	combined	with	notions	of	the	international	relations	theory,	constructivism.	The	fourth	 section	 addresses	 the	 methods	 of	 analysis	 and	 data	 collection.	 Furthermore,	 the	disparities	 between	 the	 two	 terrorist	 organizations	 and	 their	 generalizability	 to	 other	jihadist	 groups	 are	 expanded	 upon.	 Sections	 five	 and	 six	 respectively	 analyze	 the	 public	diplomacy	 strategies	 of	 ISIS	 and	 AQIM.	 First	 the	 general	 public	 diplomacy	 strategies	 are	
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investigated,	 followed	by	an	analysis	of	public	diplomacy	usage	 in	specific	events,	namely:	the	November	2015	Paris	and	March	2016	Brussels	attacks	committed	by	ISIS	and	the	2016	shootings	 in	 Burkina	 Faso	 and	 Ivory	 Coast	 perpetrated	 by	 AQIM.	 The	 discussion	 section	compares	the	public	diplomacy	strategies	of	both	actors	and	finds	that	social	media	is	more	extensively	employed	by	ISIS	than	AQIM	in	attracting	foreign	support.		
2 . 	 P u b l i c 	 D i p l o m a c y 	Public	diplomacy	 is	a	soft	power	 instrument	that	aspires	to	positively	shape	the	attitudes,	perceptions,	and	opinions	of	external	publics	as	a	means	to	attract	foreign	support.	Melissen	(2006:	 2)	 states,	 “the	 shorthand	 definition	 that	 immediately	 coveys	 the	 essence	 of	 public	diplomacy	is	that	it	involves	‘getting	other	people	on	your	side’”.	As	such,	public	diplomacy	involves	direct	cross	boundary	communication	with	the	ambition	to	effect	popular	opinion.	Likewise,	 Kelly	 (2009:	 73)	 asserts	 that	 there	 are	 three	 underlying	 purposes	 of	 public	diplomacy,	 namely	 the	distribution	 and	management	 of	 information,	 influencing	 attitudes	through	 long-term	 persuasion	 campaigns,	 and	 engagement	 with	 foreign	 publics	 to	 build	relationships,	 trust,	 and	 mutual	 understandings	 of	 one	 another.	 Because	 terrorist	organizations	 interact	 with	 the	 intended	 audience	 and	 develop	 relationships	 with	sympathizers,	the	non-state	actors	perform	the	tasks	required	for	public	diplomacy.		
After	the	Cold	War,	public	diplomacy	no	longer	was	considered	a	tool	solely	used	by	states,	as	 the	 concept	 expanded	 to	 include	 new	 players	 on	 the	 international	 stage,	 such	 as	 IOs,	NGOs,	MNCs,	and	individuals	(Gilboa,	2008:	60).	According	to	Signitzer	and	Coombs	(1992:	138)	public	diplomacy	is	applied	by	“governments	and	private	individuals	and	groups	[to]	influence	directly	or	 indirectly	 those	public	attitudes	and	opinions	which	bear	directly	on	another	 government’s	 foreign	 policy	 decisions”.	 Their	 definition	 corroborates	 public	diplomacy	 as	 an	 instrument	 implemented	 by	 a	wide	 range	 of	 actors.	 In	 fact,	 scholars	 are	progressively	discussing	 the	 rise	of	 ‘new	public	diplomacy’,	which	updates	 the	 concept	 in	accordance	to	the	information	age.	Seib	(2013:	9)	asserts	that	individuals	are	not	merely	the	audience	or	message	recipients	of	public	diplomacy;	they	also	can	disseminate	news,	values	and	 opinions	 through	 innovations	 like	 social	 media.	 Thus,	 as	 technology	 considerably	enhances	 the	 feasibility	 of	 influencing	 public	 opinion	 abroad,	 a	 larger	 array	 of	 actors	 can	conduct	public	diplomacy.	Accordingly,	jihadist	groups	suffice	as	potential	public	diplomacy	actors.		
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Another	 imperative	 characteristic	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	external	 audience	 and	 its	 government’s	 foreign	 policy	 decisions,	 as	 revealed	 earlier	 by	Signitzer	 and	Coombs’	 definition	 (1992:	 138).	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 by	winning	 the	hearts	 and	minds	of	 foreign	publics,	 policy	makers	 are	pressured	by	 their	 own	 citizens	 to	 alter	 their	perceptions,	attitudes,	or	policies	in	favor	of	the	public	diplomacy	actor	(Ibid:	140).	Hence,	a	nexus	 between	 the	 government	 and	 its	 public	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 current	 public	diplomacy	thinking.	However,	the	public	diplomacy	goal	of	jihadist	groups	is	not	to	convince	an	 entire	 foreign	 public	 or	 the	 state	 of	 its	 appeal,	 but	 instead	 vulnerable	 individuals.	Terrorist	 organizations	 seek	 to	 increase	 their	 attractiveness	 in	 a	 targeted	 group	within	 a	larger	 population,	 whilst	 spreading	 fear	 amongst	 the	 wider	 public	 as	 opposed	 to	 being	perceived	 favorably	 by	 the	 government.	 Thus,	 the	 relationship	 between	 public	 audiences	and	 their	 government	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 groups	 is	 different	 from	traditional	 public	 diplomacy.	 Inevitably,	 this	 leads	 to	 the	 question;	 to	 what	 extent	 can	Islamic	 fundamentalism	 promoted	 by	 jihadist	 organizations	 be	 considered	 public	diplomacy?	
For	 the	 promotion	 of	 extremist	 Muslim	 values	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 public	 diplomacy,	 the	concept	itself	must	be	updated.	Since	the	notion	of	public	diplomacy	has	emerged,	the	world	and	 its	 existential	 threats	 have	 drastically	 transformed.	 Through	 technological	advancements,	non-state	actors	including	terrorist	organizations	are	able	to	increase	their	sphere	 of	 influence	 beyond	 their	 mandated	 territory	 and	 recruit	 support	 worldwide	(Thompson,	 2011:	 168).	 The	 objective	 of	 influencing	 foreign	 publics	 through	 two-way	communication	 remains	 unchanged.	 However,	 public	 diplomacy	 can	 also	 be	 exerted	 to	strategically	target	a	specific	portion	of	a	larger	population	and	does	not	necessarily	aim	to	gain	the	endorsement	of	the	government	through	earning	the	trust	of	its	public.	As	such,	the	thesis	modernizes	 Gilboa’s	 non-state	 actor	model	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 include	 its	 new	potential	as	an	available	instrument	in	the	toolkit	of	terrorist	organizations.	The	theoretical	framework	section	divulges	the	adjustments	to	the	model.		
3 . 	 L i t e r a t u r e 	 R e v i e w 	Several	studies	have	been	conducted	on	the	method	of	public	diplomacy	used	by	states	 in	targeting	 foreign	 audiences	 against	 the	 ideals	 promoted	 by	 terrorist	 organizations.	According	 to	 Melissen	 (2005:	 7),	 public	 diplomacy	 became	 a	 hot	 topic	 after	 the	 9/11	
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terrorist	 attacks	 and	 the	 subsequent	 US	 invasion	 of	 Iraq,	 when	 the	 Americans	 strived	 to	acquire	public	support	for	Western	values	and	restore	the	US’s	damaged	reputation	in	the	Islamic	world.	The	self-advertising	campaign	aimed	to	reduce	popular	support	in	the	Middle	East	 for	 terrorist	 organizations	 and	 enhance	 US	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 region.	 Thus,	 analyzing	how	 states	 instigate	 public	 diplomacy	 as	 a	 strategy	 of	 counterterrorism	 has	 thoroughly	been	studied.		
Alternatively,	 Yarchi,	 Wolfsfeld,	 Sheafer	 and	 Shenhav	 (2013)	 analyzed	 the	 ability	 and	motivations	of	states	and	non-state	actors	to	promote	their	narrative	on	events	of	terror	in	the	 international	 media.	 The	 study	 exposed	 that	 the	 victimized	 country	 has	 a	 greater	opportunity	 than	 terrorist	 organizations	 in	 spreading	 rhetoric.	 However,	 the	 study	 is	limited	to	traditional	media	sources	such	as	television,	radio	and	newspapers,	which	do	not	permit	interaction	between	the	non-state	actor	and	the	recipient.	In	fact,	the	scholars	argue	that	new	media	 technology	empowers	non-state	actors	more	significantly	 than	 traditional	media	sources	and	recommends	future	studies	on	how	terrorist	groups	“bypass	traditional	media	to	promote	their	messages	directly	to	the	public”	(p.276).	This	study	aims	to	build	on	previous	 knowledge	 and	 establish	 a	 link	 between	 innovative	 technology	 and	 the	 public	diplomacy	of	jihadist	groups.		
Even	 before	 social	 media,	 terrorist	 organizations	 profited	 from	 the	 Internet	 to	communicate,	 promote	 ideology,	 plan	 operations,	 recruit,	 fundraise	 and	 train	 supporters.	Ranstorp	(2007:	31)	alleges,	“In	many	ways	cyberspace	has	created	a	virtual	university	of	jihad	with	advice	available	anytime	to	any	militant”.	The	Internet	became	a	primary	vehicle	for	 jihadist	 groups	 to	 access	 a	 wider	 audience	 of	 both	 real	 and	 potential	 sympathizers,	which	 intensified	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 interactive	 online	 platforms.	 For	 instance,	experts	 in	 the	 Chatham	House	 (2015)	 panel	 discussion,	 ‘Marketing	 Terror’,	 shed	 light	 on	how	 the	 promotion	 of	 Islamic	 fundamentalism	 has	 advanced	 immensely	 in	 recent	 years.	ISIS’s	 appeal	 and	 capacity	 to	 recruit	 external	 backing	 is	 attributed	 to	 its	 sophisticated	communication	 strategy	 and	 branding.	 The	 discussion	 identifies	 tools	 that	 facilitate	interaction	and	advertise	the	organization	crucial	for	attracting	foreign	adherents,	thereby	pinpointing	branding	and	social	media	as	key	public	diplomacy	instruments.		
Social	media	is	particularly	useful	for	terrorist	organizations	to	convey	messages	in	a	rapid,	cost-effective	manner.	Lawrence	et	al.	(2015)	found	that,	“In	the	first	24	hours	following	the	
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attacks	on	Paris,	there	were	hundreds	of	thousands	of	celebratory	tweets	from	supporters	of	 ISIS.	 An	 estimated	 50,000	 Twitter	 accounts—	 each	 having	 thousands	 of	 followers	 —	streamed	 photo	 essays,	 audio,	 video,	 news	 bulletins	 and	 theological	 writings”.	 Similarly	Janbek	and	Seib	(2011:	36)	assert	 that	AQIM	and	extremist	groups	 in	general	exploit	new	media	tools,	such	as	YouTube	or	LiveLeak,	to	upload	announcements	and	videos	of	attacks	and	keep	people	informed	about	terrorist	activity.	The	research	confirms	the	prominence	of	social	media.		
Likewise,	Liang	(2015:	2)	researched	how	the	Internet	facilitates,	intensifies	and	accelerates	processes	of	radicalization.	The	young	Muslims	targeted	by	extremist	groups	have	grown	up	with	 the	 Internet	 and	 use	 it	 for	 socialization.	 Through	 visiting	 open	 forums,	 blogs,	 and	online	 chat	 rooms,	 extremist	 ideas	 are	 spread	 and	 supported	 by	 like-minded	 individuals,	often	causing	the	amplification	of	fundamentalist	values.	Moreover,	“jihadist	and	extremist	sympathizers	freely	post	videos,	tutorials,	and	religious	propaganda	with	the	aim	to	recruit,	cultivate	 and	 solidify	 online	 partisanship	 and	 brotherhood	 in	 order	 to	 conduct	 terror”	(Ibid.).	 Thus,	 Liang	 explicates	 that	 Islamic	 fundamentalism	 is	 normalized	 and	 encouraged	online.	 The	 study	 provides	 essential	 insight	 into	 how	 social	 media	 transports	 extremist	ideology,	but	fails	to	establish	an	explicit	link	with	public	diplomacy.		
Other	 literature	 focuses	 on	 the	 radicalization	 of	 moderate	 Muslims.	 McCauley	 and	Moskalenko	(2008:	416)	define	radicalization	as	a	“change	in	beliefs,	feelings	and	behaviors	in	directions	that	increasingly	justify	intergroup	violence	and	demand	sacrifice	in	defense	of	the	 in-group”.	 The	 feelings	 are	 linked	 to	 common	 group	 identification,	 thus	 connecting	closely	 to	 the	 collective	 identity	 stressed	 in	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework	of	 the	 thesis	via	constructivism.	Kinvall	(2004)	actually	uses	constructivism	to	explain	how	individuals	often	radicalize	to	establish	closer	identification	with	extremist	organizations	and	to	be	accepted	as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 in-group.	 Moreover,	 radicalization	 is	 predicted	 to	 occur	 in	 discrete	stages.	 According	 to	 Aly	 et	 al.	 (2016:	 4),	 the	 first	 stage	 is	 pre-radicalization	 and	 self-identification,	 in	 which	 individuals	 want	 to	 learn	 more	 about	 the	 ideology	 and	 religious	beliefs	 by	 visiting	 the	 organization’s	webpages	 and	 seeking	 contact.	 The	 second	 phase	 is	indoctrination,	 in	 which	 core	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 beliefs	 are	 internalized	 and	 the	individual	pursues	participation	and	assists	in	advancing	the	goals	of	the	group.	In	the	final	stage,	 jihadization,	 the	 individual	 connects	 with	 other	 recruits	 and	 members	 of	 the	organization	 and	 contributes	 in	 the	 planning	 and	 carrying	 out	 of	 attacks.	 The	 research	
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identifies	the	importance	of	generating	an	“us	versus	them”	narrative	and	distinguishes	the	stages	of	radicalization,	which	is	likely	taken	into	account	in	the	public	diplomacy	strategy	of	terrorist	organizations.		
Radicalization	 literature	 typically	 analyzes	 social,	psychological	 and	economic	 factors	 that	profoundly	influence	a	lone,	victimized	individual.	Wilner	and	Dubouloz	(2010:	9)	identify	three	 pertinent	 precursors	 of	 Western	 Islamic	 radicalization,	 namely	 (1)	 socio-political	alienation	caused	by	failed	integration	and	xenophobia,	(2)	deepening	religious	identity	that	justifies	 radicalization	 and	 violence	 and	 (3)	 rejection	 of	 foreign	 policy	 positions	 due	 to	perceived	 injustices	 taken	 against	 Muslims	 worldwide.	 Additionally,	 poor	 economic	conditions	 and	 low	 quality	 of	 life	 encourage	 radicalization,	 which	 might	 be	 relevant	 to	AQIM’s	 public	 diplomacy.	 The	 causes	 of	 radicalization	 potentially	 elucidate	 why	 foreign	publics	respond	to	 the	public	diplomacy	promoted	by	 terrorist	organizations	and	 indicate	who	 most	 likely	 is	 the	 recipient.	 Although	 the	 research	 provides	 a	 noteworthy	understanding	of	why	 radicalization	occurs,	 it	 fails	 to	 explain	how	messages	 conveyed	by	the	non-state	actors	and	their	interaction	with	foreign	publics	results	in	radicalization	and	increased	 support	 for	 their	 cause.	 Thus,	 this	 thesis	 draws	 a	 connection	 between	radicalization	literature	and	public	diplomacy.		
Finally,	 the	 ICCT	 (2016)	 published	 research	 explaining	 how	 terrorist	 attacks	 facilitate	radicalization.	As	revealed	earlier,	moderate	Muslims	often	radicalize	because	of	feeling	like	outsiders	 in	 their	 society.	The	 terrorist	 attacks	 carried	out	on	European	soil	by	European	nationals	 leads	 to	 increased	 discrimination	 against	 minority	 groups,	 which	 in	 turn	intensifies	 extremist	 views	 amongst	 the	 marginalized	 groups.	 Consequently,	 acts	 of	terrorism	often	 ignite	 “a	vicious	circle	of	radicalization,	aggression	and	violent	responses”	(Van	Ginkel	&	Entenmann,	2016:	14).	Van	Ginkel	and	Entenmann	(2016:	55)	also	recognize	the	majority	of	ISIS	foreign	fighters	as	young,	vulnerable	individuals,	thereby	identifying	the	population	most	likely	targeted	by	ISIS’s	public	diplomacy.			
In	 sum,	 the	 examination	 of	 preexisting	 literature	 reveals	 key	 characteristics	 of	 the	 online	presence	by	 terrorist	organizations,	 the	 targeted	audience,	 and	why	 radicalization	occurs.	Nevertheless,	 previous	 research	 neglects	 how	 terrorist	 organizations	 utilize	 public	diplomacy	 to	 favorably	 influence	 public	 opinion	 within	 targeted	 groups	 of	 a	 foreign	population	 and	 strengthen	 its	 potential	 of	 recruiting	manpower.	 Consequently,	 the	 thesis	
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topic	provides	novel	insights	into	how	jihadist	groups	promote	Islamic	fundamentalism	and	establish	 a	 positive	 perception	 abroad,	 thereby	 fostering	 both	 homegrown	 terrorism	 and	foreign	support.	Homegrown	terrorism	is	defined	as	“violent	activity	related	to	and	inspired	by	 radical	 Islamism	 perpetrated	 by	 individuals	 of…	 second	 and	 third	 generation	immigrants,	 long-term	foreign	residents,	and	Muslim	converts”	(Wilner	&	Dubouloz,	2010:	1).	Additionally,	by	comparing	 ISIS	and	AQIM,	 the	 thesis	explicates	how	different	 types	of	terrorist	organizations	use	public	diplomacy	and	in	what	way	the	competing	strategies	vary	in	 their	capabilities.	 In	 fact,	 relatively	 little	research	has	been	conducted	on	AQIM’s	use	of	social	 media	 and	 methods	 of	 recruitment.	 The	 following	 section	 outlines	 the	 theoretical	framework	applied	to	analyze	the	public	diplomacy	of	jihadist	organizations.		
4 . 	 T h e o r e t i c a l 	 F r a m e w o r k 	The	 public	 diplomacy	 section	 demonstrated	 the	 necessity	 to	 go	 beyond	 current	 public	diplomacy	thinking	and	update	the	concept	to	include	how	it	is	strategically	being	employed	by	non-state	actors	to	boost	attractiveness	abroad	and	mobilize	external	support.	The	thesis	upgrades	 Gilboa’s	 (2001)	 non-state	 actor	 model	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 extend	 the	instrument	to	jihadist	groups.	Gilboa’s	model	is	one	of	the	few	theories	that	accounts	for	the	usage	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 by	 non-state	 actors.	 The	model,	 in	 its	 current	 form,	 elucidates	how	 media	 and	 other	 available	 resources	 are	 utilized	 to	 communicate	 with	 foreign	audiences.	 Just	 like	 nations,	 non-state	 actors	 use	 public	 diplomacy	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 install	 a	positive	image	of	themselves	in	the	minds	of	foreign	publics,	who	in	turn	exert	pressure	on	their	own	government	to	adjust	their	policies	and	attitudes.	Furthermore,	non-state	actors	often	 implement	 public	 diplomacy	 as	 a	method	 of	 branding,	 in	which	 they	 promote	 their	cause	 to	 influence	 public	 opinion	 and	 rally	 support,	 thereby	 achieving	 their	 underlying	interests	(Gilboa,	2008:	87).	Despite	the	model	providing	essential	insight	into	how	a	wide	array	of	actors	strategically	make	use	of	public	diplomacy,	as	it	stands	now,	the	framework	does	not	apply	to	the	Islamic	fundamentalist	values	promoted	by	terrorist	organizations.		
In	 Gilboa’s	 (2001:	 6)	 model,	 non-state	 actors	 seek	 to	 “achieve	 their	 domestic	 goals	 by	creating	 linkages	 with	 influential	 individuals	 and	 groups	 in	 foreign	 societies”.	 Although	some	non-state	actors	ultimately	strive	to	impact	the	behavior	of	governments,	this	is	not	a	precondition.	 In	 the	 updated	 model,	 non-state	 actors	 via	 public	 diplomacy	 engage	 in	dialogue	 with	 general	 or	 targeted	 foreign	 populations,	 with	 the	 primary	 intention	 to	
	 10	
intensify	their	appeal.	Therefore,	the	modernized	model	accounts	for	several	types	of	non-state	 actors,	 such	 as	 NGOs	 that	 attempt	 to	 alter	 state	 behavior	 via	 pressure	 from	 its	population	and	 terrorist	organizations,	which	 instead	aspire	 to	mobilize	 support	 for	 their	cause.	 The	 adjustments	 consist	 of	 widening	 the	 span	 of	 non-actors	 to	 include	 jihadist	groups,	narrowing	the	focus	from	the	general	public	as	the	audience	to	targeted	groups	and	individuals,	and	finally,	removing	the	foreign	public-government	nexus	as	a	requirement	for	public	diplomacy.		
The	new	 conception	of	 public	 diplomacy	 is	 intertwined	with	notions	 of	 constructivism	 to	explain	how	repeated	 interaction	 through	public	diplomacy	establishes	 an	 intersubjective	understanding	 of	 one	 another	 and	 creates	 shared	 ideational	 structures	 that	 influence	behavior.	 Constructivism	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 public	 diplomacy,	 because	 both	 challenge	 the	prevalence	of	material	power	 in	achieving	a	desired	outcome	and	alternatively	emphasize	the	importance	of	ideational	structures	grounded	in	shared	norms	and	values.	According	to	Wendt	(1992:	404),	identities	and	corresponding	interests	are	socially	constructed	through	interacting	with	others	 in	 the	 international	arena.	 Identities	and	 interests	are	not	 fixed	or	static,	 but	 instead	 subject	 to	 change.	 States	 and	 other	 actors	 adjust	 their	 behavior	 and	principal	objectives	based	on	 the	meaning	 they	assign	 to	a	particular	situation.	Moreover,	interaction	 between	 two	 or	 more	 actors	 result	 in	 a	 socialization	 process	 in	 which	 the	socializer	attempts	to	generate	“changes	in	the	definitions	of	identity	and	interests	held	by	the	 socializees”	 (Wendt,	 1992:	 976).	 If	 the	 socialization	 process	 is	 successful,	 the	 actors	establish	a	common	identity	due	to	the	internalization	of	shared	norms	and	values	and	will	approach	 scenarios	 based	 on	 the	 logic	 of	 appropriateness.	 Hopf	 (1998:	 173)	 similarly	asserts	that,	“meaningful	behavior,	or	action	is	possible	only	within	an	intersubjective	social	context”.	 Actors	 derive	 their	 understanding	 and	 relationship	with	 others	 based	 on	norms	and	practices	they	hold	and	share.	As	such,	constructivism	can	be	 implemented	to	explain	how	 two-way	 communication	between	 terrorist	 organizations	 and	 their	public	diplomacy	recipients	construct	common	identities	based	on	Islamic	fundamentalist	values	and	shared	interests,	which	permits	the	jihadists	to	recruit	foreign	support.		
Consequently,	 constructivism	and	public	diplomacy	complement	each	other.	Whilst	public	diplomacy	 reveals	 why	 and	 how	 jihadist	 groups	 reach	 out	 to	 foreign	 publics	 to	 spread	radical	Islamism	and	bolster	encouragement	for	their	cause,	the	model	fails	to	explain	why	the	audience	responds	to	the	conveyed	messages	and	choose	to	support	or	join	the	terrorist	
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organization.	 This	 is	 where	 constructivism	 makes	 a	 contribution,	 as	 it	 provides	 an	understanding	 of	 why	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 is	 able	 to	 attract	 support	 from	 the	 recipient	side.	 Interaction	 and	 socialization	 processes	 create	 common	 identities	 and	 shared	 norms	and	values,	which	in	turn	influence	the	behavior	of	the	public	diplomacy	audience.	The	use	of	 social	 media	 by	 terrorist	 organizations	 to	 promote	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 ideology	 is	predicted	 to	 be	 a	 powerful	 public	 diplomacy	 tool.	 The	 social	 interaction	 conducted	 via	online	 platforms	 as	 well	 as	 in	 person	 enables	 deconstruction	 of	 existing	 identities	 and	creates	 a	 new,	 shared	 sense	 of	 belonging,	 leading	 to	 radicalization	 and	 patronage	 for	 the	organization.		
To	sum	up,	when	integrating	the	constructivist	approach	with	the	non-state	actor	model	of	public	diplomacy,	a	more	holistic	understanding	of	 the	public	diplomacy	potential	of	non-actors	and	its	capabilities	is	provided.	To	increase	their	appeal	and	recruit	adherence	from	foreign	publics,	non-state	actors	brand	their	image	and	reputation	to	targeted	populations	overseas.	Online	platforms	and	other	 communication	 strategies	 are	employed	 to	 facilitate	interaction	 between	 the	 ‘socializer’	 or	 the	 non-state	 actor	 and	 the	 ‘socializee’,	 the	 public	diplomacy	recipient.	Through	two-way	dialogue,	common	norms	and	values	are	formed	and	internalized,	 resulting	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 intersubjective	 understanding	 of	 one	another	grounded	in	a	shared	identity.	As	interests	are	derived	from	an	actor’s	identity,	the	public	diplomacy	recipients	adjust	their	behavior	in	accordance	to	the	goals	and	aspirations	of	the	non-state	actor.	Based	on	the	abovementioned	theoretical	 framework,	the	following	hypotheses	are	proposed:		
Hypothesis	1:	 If	non-state	actors	can	 increase	their	attractiveness	by	branding	their	values	and	 cause	 to	 foreign	 publics,	 then	 the	 brand	 promoted	 by	 terrorist	 organizations	 should	appeal	to	the	needs	of	the	targeted	audience	to	mobilize	foreign	support.	 It	 is	additionally	expected	 that	 actively	 investing	 resources	 in	 branding	 enhance	 the	 capability	 of	 jihadist	groups	to	reach	a	larger	audience.		
Hypothesis	2:	 If	 the	public	diplomacy	exerted	by	non-state	actors	 influence	 the	beliefs	and	behavior	 of	 foreign	 publics,	 then	 terrorist	 organizations	 should	 facilitate	 favorable	 public	opinion,	 protests	 and	 support	 through	 engagement	 and	 relationship	 building	 with	 their	targeted	audience.		
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Hypothesis	 3:	 If	 constructivism	 rightly	 postulates	 that	 repeated	 interaction	 establishes	intersubjective	understandings	of	one	another,	then	public	diplomacy	strategies	of	terrorist	organizations	 should	 facilitate	 two-way	 dialogue	 to	 mobilize	 foreign	 support.	 Jihadist	groups	 using	 social	 media	 to	 engage	 with	 foreign	 audiences	 are	 expected	 to	 be	 more	capable	of	attracting	foreign	support.		
Hypothesis	4:	 If	 constructivism	correctly	assumes	 that	 the	perception	of	another’s	 identity	and	corresponding	interests	 influence	behavior,	 then	foreign	support	should	be	motivated	by	 the	 terrorist	 organizations	 containing	 soft	 power	 and	 sufficiently	 generating	 the	perception	of	a	common	identity.		
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 use	 by	 ISIS	 and	 AQIM	 tests	 the	 abovementioned	hypotheses.	The	following	section	outlines	how	the	hypotheses	are	examined	by	explaining	the	methodology,	data	and	data	collection.	Moreover,	 the	core	variables	are	 identified	and	operationalized.		
5 . 	 M e t h o d s 	 o f 	 A n a l y s i s 	The	methodology	employed	consists	of	a	small-N	comparative	analysis	of	two	case	studies	in	combination	with	practical	discourse	and	content	analysis	and	process	tracing.	The	thesis	investigates	 the	strategic	use	of	public	diplomacy	by	 two	non-state	actors,	 ISIS	and	AQIM.	Through	 juxtaposing	 the	 variations	 in	 public	 diplomacy	 usage,	 capabilities,	 and	 tactics,	inferences	can	be	made	concerning	the	public	diplomacy	potential	of	terrorist	organizations	differing	in	size,	region	and	organizational	makeup.	The	conception	of	public	diplomacy	has	not	been	applied	 to	 terrorists,	 and	 in	 result,	 the	 comparative	 study	not	only	 instigates	 an	innovative	 discussion	 on	 extending	 the	 instrument	 to	 jihadist	 organizations,	 but	 also	pinpoints	 fundamental	 distinctions	 between	 the	 groups	 and	 its	 public	 diplomacy	competence.		
The	comparative	case	study	investigates	both	the	public	diplomacy	potency	of	the	terrorist	organizations	 and	 the	 role	 it	 played	 in	 specific	 acts	 of	 terrorism.	 The	 public	 diplomacy	analysis	examines	the	ability	of	both	organizations	to	gain	influence	abroad,	particularly	by	observing	 the	 channels	 of	 communication	 to	 interact	 with	 foreign	 audiences,	 tactics	 to	brand	and	enhance	 attractiveness,	 and	possible	motivations	behind	 the	public	diplomacy.	The	assessment	of	the	public	diplomacy	strategies	indicates	how	terrorist	organizations	go	
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about	attracting	foreign	support	and	whether	there	are	disparities	in	the	public	diplomacy	induced	by	organizational	differences.	
Alternatively,	the	inspection	of	specific	events	of	terrorist	attacks	provides	a	more	practical	understanding	of	how	public	diplomacy	employed	by	terrorist	organizations	 influence	the	behavior	 of	 its	 audience.	 Observations	 such	 as	 whether	 the	 attacks	 were	 committed	 by	foreign	fighters,	 if	widespread	international	appraisal	 followed	the	 incidents,	and	whether	opposing	 identities	 are	 emphasized,	 expound	 the	 role	public	diplomacy	may	have	played.	The	analysis	of	ISIS	examines	the	latest	terrorist	attacks	in	Brussels	and	Paris,	whilst	for	the	AQIM	 case,	 the	 recent	 violence	 in	 Grand	 Bassam	 and	 Ouagadougou	 is	 addressed.	 These	events	 were	 selected	 due	 to	 being	 immensely	 recent	 and	 thus,	 not	 heavily	 investigated.	Furthermore,	both	the	attacks	occurred	outside	the	home	base	of	the	terrorist	groups	and	targeted	foreign	civilians.	Due	to	time	constraints,	the	specific	events	are	examined	for	the	purpose	of	 illustrating	 the	practical	 implications	of	 the	public	 diplomacy,	 but	no	 in-depth	explanation	of	the	reasons,	motives,	and	consequences	of	the	attacks	are	provided.		
Prior	to	variable	identification,	the	reasoning	for	selecting	ISIS	and	AQIM	as	case	studies	is	explained.	Although	analyzing	al-Qaeda	in	its	entirety	allows	for	more	data	and	information,	AQIM	 is	 chosen	as	a	 case	study	due	 to	containing	profoundly	diverse	characteristics	 from	ISIS.	 Unlike	 ISIS	 and	 al-Qaeda,	 AQIM	 is	 a	 regionally	 situated	 group	 in	 North	 Africa.	Conversely,	 ISIS	 is	more	 internationalized	in	 its	 focus	and	influence.	 Jihadist	organizations	that	 are	 regionally	 instead	 of	 globally	 focused	 may	 possibly	 invest	 less	 in	 their	 public	diplomacy.	 Moreover,	 the	 caliphate	 of	 ISIS	 is	 located	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 whilst	 AQIM’s	influence	 is	 largely	 limited	 to	 Africa.	 By	 selecting	 both	 actors,	 underlying	 differences	between	terrorist	organizations	positioned	 in	 the	Middle	East	and	 in	Africa	are	accounted	for.	Additionally,	like	several	alternative	jihadist	groups,	AQIM	is	an	offshoot	of	the	larger	al-Qaeda	organization,	whilst	 contrarily;	 ISIS	 remains	a	unified	group	and	 is	not	 fragmented	into	numerous	smaller	 factions.	By	examining	different	 types	of	groups,	 the	 results	of	 the	analysis	are	more	generalizable	to	other	jihadist	organizations.	Also,	confounding	variables	such	as	 regional	 variations,	 group	unity,	 and	geographic	 scope	of	 influence	are	accounted	for	by	selecting	two	fundamentally	distinctive	extremist	Muslim	groups.		
The	dissimilarities	in	the	goals	and	capabilities	of	the	terrorist	organizations	shed	light	on	the	 public	 diplomacy	 potential	 of	 varying	 non-state	 actors.	 One	 possible	 finding	 could	 be	
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that	 ISIS	uses	 social	media	platforms	more	extensively	 than	AQIM	 to	mobilize	 support,	 as	ISIS	emphasizes	spreading	its	image	to	a	wider	international	audience	than	AQIM.	The	latter	group	 instead	 may	 focus	 on	 countries	 in	 its	 direct	 neighborhood.	 Furthermore,	 the	 two	groups	may	be	competing	for	influence	and	foreign	support	via	their	public	diplomacy.	Due	to	the	sophisticated	media	campaign	conducted	by	ISIS,	AQIM	may	have	lost	power	and	is	launching	violent	terrorist	attacks	to	get	back	on	the	radar	of	sympathizers.		
The	cases	are	analyzed	with	the	aforementioned	modified	non-state	actor	model	combined	with	constructivism	as	the	theoretical	framework.	Thus,	the	research	implements	deductive	logic	or	 “the	process	 that	enables	us	 to	use	 theories	 to	explain	specific	events”	 (Manheim,	2012:	 21).	 However,	 prior	 to	 applying	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 to	 the	 cases,	 the	independent	and	dependent	variables	must	be	identified	and	operationalized:	
The	 first	 independent	 variable	 is	 the	 brand	 promoted	 by	 the	 jihadist	 groups,	 which	elucidates	 in	 what	 way	 the	 organizations	 want	 to	 be	 perceived	 and	 who	 its	 intended	audience	 is.	 The	 values	 and	 messages	 in	 the	 organization’s	 narrative	 are	 examined	 to	identify	 the	core	components	of	 the	brand.	The	second	 independent	variable	 is	 the	use	of	public	diplomacy	by	the	terrorist	organizations.	The	variable	is	measured	by	analyzing	the	channels	of	communication	implemented	to	interact	with	the	targeted	audience.	The	usage	of	online	media	platforms	including	LiveLeak,	blogs,	Twitter,	and	Facebook	are	inspected	as	indicators,	 including	 the	 content	 published	 on	 the	 official	 social	 media	 accounts	 of	 the	terrorist	organizations	and	publications	on	the	respondent’s	personal	accounts.	Moreover,	direct	interaction	through	human	contact	or	personal	connections	also	is	investigated	as	a	public	 diplomacy	 strategy.	 The	 third	 independent	 variable	 is	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	common	 identity.	Based	on	constructivist	 assumptions,	 common	 identities	are	 formed	via	repeated	 interaction,	shared	norms	and	values,	and	 intersubjective	understandings	of	one	another.	 As	 such,	 the	 variable	 is	 operationalized	 by	 the	 assessment	 of	 discourse	 that	emphasizes	common	norms,	values,	culture	and	religion.	The	content	is	studied	both	from	the	agent	and	audience	standpoints.	The	 final	 independent	variable	 is	soft	power	entailed	by	both	ISIS	and	AQIM.	Nye	(2008:	94)	defines	soft	power	as	the	ability	to	obtain	a	desired	outcome	through	attraction,	in	which	others	want	what	you	want.	Soft	power	is	grounded	in	norms,	 values	 and	 culture	 deemed	 attractive	 by	 a	 foreign	 public.	 Hence,	 the	 variable	 is	measured	by	analyzing	statements	and	actions	in	support	of	the	group’s	culture,	extremist	take	on	 Islam,	and	core	principles.	 Soft	power	differs	 from	common	 identity,	 as	 the	 latter	
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emphasizes	a	sense	of	unity,	such	as	by	forming	an	in-group	with	the	jihadist	organizations.	In	 contrast,	 soft	 power	 highlights	 why	 foreign	 publics	 perceive	 the	 ideology	 and	 cause	promoted	as	attractive.		
Alternatively,	 the	dependent	variable	 is	 foreign	support.	The	aimed	outcome	of	 the	public	diplomacy	exerted	by	 terrorist	organizations	 is	 to	 increase	 its	attractiveness	and	mobilize	external	 audiences	 in	 accordance	 to	 its	 cause.	 As	 such,	 foreign	 support	 is	 measured	 by	appraisal	 for	 the	group,	 facilitation	 in	diffusing	messages,	 recruitment	and	mobilization	of	foreign	 civilians.	 For	 example,	 the	 estimated	 number	 of	 foreign	 fighters	 joining	 the	organization,	statements	of	support,	and	 favorable	protests	signify	positive	public	opinion	in	 targeted	 populations.	 However,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 mention	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	empirically	determine	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 public	 diplomacy	 and	whether	 it	 is	 the	 leading	cause	of	the	foreign	support.	Nevertheless,	a	theoretical	case	for	support	is	made.		
As	a	means	to	derive	deductions	from	the	theories,	techniques	of	process	tracing	are	used.	Bennet	and	George	(2005:	206)	state,	process	tracing	“attempts	to	identify	the	intervening	causal	process–	the	causal	chain	and	causal	mechanism	–between	an	independent	variable	and	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable”.	 Therefore,	 theoretical	 causal	 links	 between	public	diplomacy	strategies	implemented	by	both	ISIS	and	AQIM	and	its	ability	of	mobilizing	foreign	support	are	investigated.	As	mentioned	earlier	in	the	section,	techniques	of	content	and	 discourse	 analysis	 are	 also	 applied	 to	 explicate	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 tactics	 of	 the	terrorist	 organizations.	 To	 do	 so,	 scholarly	 literature,	 news	 articles,	 media	 sources,	recruitment	videos,	think	tank	research,	speeches,	released	statements	and	personal	stories	from	both	 the	 jihadist	groups	and	 foreign	publics	 that	 responded	 to	 the	public	diplomacy	are	examined.	Therefore,	 the	data	consists	of	both	primary	and	secondary	sources.	Due	to	the	 limited	time	and	resources	available,	 it	may	be	necessary	to	mainly	rely	on	secondary	sources,	particularly	academically	published	research	and	news	articles.		
A	significant	limitation	faced	in	the	data	collection	is	the	inability	to	speak	and	read	Arabic,	making	several	texts,	videos,	and	messages	inaccessible.	However,	because	of	the	interest	of	jihadist	organizations	to	contact	new	generations	of	sympathizers	and	recruit	support	in	the	West,	 numerous	 websites,	 videos,	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 communication	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 in	English.	ISIS	appears	to	have	more	English	content	available	than	AQIM.	Fortunately,	some	Arabic	texts	are	translated	and	analyzed	by	previous	research	and	available	via	secondary	
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sources.	 Another	 limitation	 is	 the	 collection	 of	 primary	 sources,	 such	 as	 publications	 on	social	media	 sites.	 Accounts	 associated	with	 terrorist	 organizations	 are	 often	 removed	 or	suspended,	resulting	in	the	analysis	of	actual	dialogue	between	terrorist	organizations	and	the	intended	audience	to	be	difficult.	Again,	the	thesis	will	have	to	rely	on	secondary	sources	that	already	processed	primary	data.		
6 . 	 T h e 	 S t r a t e g i c 	 U s e 	 o f 	 P u b l i c 	 D i p l o m a c y 	 B y 	 I S I S 	6.1	Public	Diplomacy	via	a	Sophisticated	Media	Campaign	ISIS,	like	AQIM,	originated	as	a	faction	of	the	larger	al-Qaeda	network,	but	in	2013,	‘al-Qaeda	of	 Iraq’,	 the	predecessor	of	 ISIS,	divorced	 from	the	group.	Through	separation,	 leader	Abu	Bakr	al-Baghdadi,	endeavored	to	“absorb	al-Qaeda’s	freshest	and	most	promising	franchise	in	Syria”,	triggering	a	cruel	competition	for	power	and	influence	(Watts,	2015).	ISIS	profited	significantly	from	its	prior	affiliation	with	al-Qaeda	regarding	its	modern	public	diplomacy	campaign.	 Since	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Internet,	 al-Qaeda	 strategically	 made	 use	 of	 the	technology	 to	 enlarge	 its	 sphere	 of	 influence.	 In	 fact,	 al-Qaeda	 has	 nearly	 two	 decades	 of	experience	online.	The	group’s	 leader,	Ayman	al-Zawahiri,	once	stated,	“We	[al-Qaeda]	are	in	a	battle,	and	more	than	half	of	 this	battle	 is	 taking	place	 in	 the	battlefield	of	 the	media.	And	that	we	are…	in	a	race	for	the	hearts	and	minds	of	our	people”	(Aly	et	al.,	2016:	2).	The	statement	suggests	that	jihadist	groups	for	some	time	now	have	attempted	to	promote	their	values	 and	 cause	 via	 public	 diplomacy.	 In	 result,	 ISIS	 learned	 the	 importance	 of	 online	communication	from	its	former	partner,	which	it	later	perfected	(Ryan,	2014).	Interestingly,	little	 emphasis	 by	 governments	was	 placed	 on	 the	 Internet	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 terrorism	until	ISIS	revolutionized	online	platforms	to	radicalize	and	recruit	foreign	publics.		
“Social	 media's	 public	 and	 instantaneous	 nature	 is	 ideal	 for	 reaching	 ISIS's	 target	audience—young,	 disillusioned	Westerners	 who	 are	 ripe	 for	 radicalization—and	 it	 gives	them	 a	 sense	 of	 community”	 (Ryan,	 2014).	 Twitter,	 Facebook,	 YouTube,	 and	 online	 chat	rooms	 are	 used	 by	 ISIS	 to	 both	 brand	 its	 cause	 to	 the	 impressionable	 audience	 and	 to	establish	 a	 connection	 with	 potential	 sympathizers.	 Although	 the	 ability	 to	 construct	 a	common	 identity	 through	 social	 media	 is	 key	 to	 ISIS’s	 triumph	 in	 mobilizing	 foreign	support,	 it	 is	crucial	 to	gain	a	deeper	understanding	of	 the	 image	ISIS	attempts	to	portray	itself	as,	raising	the	questions,	what	is	ISIS’s	brand?	How	is	it	promoted?	And	why	is	it	found	appealing?		
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To	 brand	 its	 cause	 to	 the	 global	 audience,	 ISIS	 has	 established	 a	 specialized	media	wing	responsible	for	the	distribution	of	information	and	production	of	videos,	images,	tweets	and	other	content	to	notify	foreign	populations	of	 its	achievements.	In	fact,	the	Al-Ḥayāt	Media	
Centre	is	immensely	active.	In	July	2014	alone,	eleven	high-definition	videos	were	launched	in	 English–	 that	 is	 one	 video	 uploaded	 every	 three	 days	 (Liang,	 2015:	 6).	 Moreover,	 the	media	 content	 published	 online	 reaches	 its	 intended	 audience	 at	 an	 incredible	 pace.	 To	illustrate,	 the	 hour-long	 documentary,	 ‘The	 Flames	 of	 War:	 Fighting	 Has	 Just	 Began’,	released	by	Al-Ḥayāt	in	September	2014,	was	watched	more	than	18,000	times	within	seven	hours,	 particularly	 because	 thousands	 of	 supporters	 re-tweeted	 the	 link	 and	 posted	 the	video	 on	 alternative	websites	 (Barrett,	 2014:	 52).	 Consequently,	 ISIS	 is	 able	 to	 brand	 its	image	to	global	adherents	in	a	fast,	cost-effective	manner.	Winter	(2015:	18)	identifies	five	interrelated	 themes	 that	 constitute	 ISIS’s	 brand,	 namely	 brutality,	 victimhood,	 belonging,	militarism	and	apocalyptic	utopianism.	Although	the	themes	each	play	a	role	 in	recruiting	support	 from	 targeted	 audiences,	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 all	 components	 is	 beyond	 the	scope	 of	 the	 thesis.	 Rather,	 only	 the	 assumptions	 regarding	 the	 themes,	 brutality	 and	belonging,	are	addressed.	
Brutality	is	the	most	evident	component	of	ISIS’s	brand,	as	revealed	by	the	countless	videos	released	 online	 depicting	 excessive	 violence,	 such	 as	 the	 beheadings	 of	 prisoners.	 One	example	 is	 the	execution	video	of	American	 journalist	 James	Foley	 in	August	2014	(Aly	et	al.,	 2016:	 3).	 Although	 the	 footage	 of	 barbaric	 acts	 is	 subjugated	 to	 global	 criticism,	 the	videos	 entail	 an	 important	 public	 diplomacy	function.	 The	 graphic	 images	 repulse	 the	majority	 of	 its	 viewers,	 yet	 a	 fraction	 of	 the	watchers	 is	 inspired	by	 the	violence:	exactly	 the	people	whom	ISIS	aspires	to	reach	(Ryan,	2014).	
Figure	 1	 to	 the	 right	 serves	 as	 an	 example	 of	support	 for	 brutality,	 as	 the	 photo	 displays	 an	activist	 at	 a	 pro-ISIS	 demonstration	 in	 Sydney	encouraging	 the	 decapitation	 of	 enemies.	 The	broadcasting	of	vehement	imageries	enables	ISIS	to	brand	 its	 extremist	 interpretation	of	 Islam	 to	foreign	 audiences	 and	 dehumanize	 the	 enemy.	Terrorist	organizations	compete	 for	power,	 influence,	 financial	and	human	resources.	The	Figure	1.	Source:	Burke	(2014),	News.com.au		
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brutal	rhetoric	differentiates	ISIS	from	moderate	alternatives,	including	al-Qaeda,	which	has	forbidden	its	followers	to	behead	captives	and	condemns	ISIS	for	its	extreme	use	of	violence	(Holbrook,	2015:	95;	Greene,	2015:	12).	Unrestricted	brutality	 fosters	 the	perception	 that	ISIS	adheres	 to	a	more	 ‘pure’	 form	of	 Islam	and	 is	on	 the	 ‘winning	 team’	 (Liang,	2015:	4).	Bintchaos,	an	unknown	female	ISIS	supporter,	confirms	the	attraction	of	the	winning	brand	by	 stating	 on	her	 blog,	 “Islamic	 State	 is	 the	 classic	 scifi	 underdog	battling	 a	 seemingly	 all	powerful	Evil	Empire	America	against	impossible	odds–	and	in	the	very	best	scifi	tradition	–	
they	are	winning”	(Bintchaos,	2015A).		
Although	brutality	plays	a	vital	role	in	ISIS’s	brand,	it	is	the	sense	of	belonging	and	creation	of	 a	 community	 that	 appears	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	 forces	 drawing	 in	 foreign	support.	As	revealed	by	radicalization	literature,	alienated	individuals	are	most	susceptible	to	extremism.	The	majority	of	the	Western	foreign	fighters	are	defined	as	identity	seekers.	Due	to	feeling	 like	outsiders	 in	their	society	of	origin,	 they	search	for	an	environment	and	inclusive	 group	 that	 provides	 them	 with	 a	 place	 of	belonging.	 ISIS	 preys	 on	 young,	 disillusioned	individuals	and	offers	them	a	group	identity	centered	on	 the	 Islamic	 ummah1 	(Quantum,	 2015:	 2).	 The	jihadist	 organization	 frequently	 releases	 videos	 and	photographs	of	fighters	sitting	together	and	enjoying	each	 other’s	 company,	 such	 as	 drinking	 tea,	 singing	or	storytelling	(Winter,	2015:	27).	The	distribution	of	such	 imagery	 promotes	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 brotherhood	united	in	the	caliphate.	One	example	is	the	video	‘Eid	Greetings	 from	 the	 Land	 of	 the	 Caliphate’	 picturing	brothers	from	around	the	world	socializing	in	a	park	with	their	families	(ISIS,	2014B).	Another	illustration	is	a	photograph	found	online	on	the	personal	Twitter	account	 of	 an	 ISIS	 supporter,	 displaying	 jihads	 in	military	 uniform	 enjoying	 a	 milkshake	 together	
																																																								1	The	 Islamic	ummah	 is	 a	 term	used	 in	 the	Quran	 referring	 to	a	 religious	community.	The	
ummah	 involves	 “ethnical,	 linguistic	 or	 religious	 bodies	 of	 people	who	 are	 objects	 of	 the	divine	plan	of	salvation”	(Denny,	1975:	34).		
Figure	2.	Source:	Suspended	Pro-ISIS	Twitter	account		
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(see	Figure	2).	Despite	the	text	above	the	photo	being	in	Arabic,	it	appears	that	the	purpose	of	the	image	is	to	generate	the	sense	of	belonging	in	a	welcoming	community.		
ISIS	 devotes	 substantial	 amounts	 of	 time	 and	 resources	 in	 branding	 its	 cause	 to	 foreign	publics.	 The	 promoted	 rhetoric	 induces	 interest	 in	 the	 intended	 audience	 to	 learn	 more	about	 the	 group	 and	 their	 ideology,	 persuading	 sympathizers	 to	 instigate	 dialogue.	 Thus,	branding	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	 pre-radicalization	 and	 self-identification	 phase	 of	 the	radicalization	 cycle	 (Aly	et	 al.,	 2016:	4).	However,	 to	 increase	attractiveness	and	mobilize	foreign	 publics,	 interaction	 with	 the	 message	 recipients	 is	 essential.	 Nye	 (2008:	 102)	confirms	 that	 strategic	 communication	 and	 long-term	 relationship	 building	 is	 key	 to	 a	successful	public	diplomacy	strategy.	One	of	the	most	popular	channels	of	communication	is	Twitter,	which	“is	used	for	purposes	of	recruitment	and	indoctrination,	as	well	as	to	build	a	transnational	community	of	violent	extremism”	(Klausen,	2015:	18).	Twitter’s	popularity	is	attributed	 to	 the	 less	 consistent	 suspension	 of	 accounts	 associated	 with	 terrorist	organizations	in	comparison	to	other	social	media	platforms.		
To	 facilitate	 communication,	 ISIS	 promoters	 browse	 social	 media	 platforms	 for	 potential	sympathizers,	whom	often	 contact	 pro-ISIS	 accounts	 for	 information	 on	 the	 organization.	Once	 connected,	 ISIS	 zealots	 in	 an	 incremental	 process	 promote	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	values	and	guide	the	individual	into	delegitimizing	their	society	of	origin	and	constructing	a	shared	 identity	 with	 the	 jihadist	 group	 (Morris,	 2015:	 8).	 In	 one	 case,	 Alex–	 a	 lonely,	Christian,	 American	 girl	 –reached	 out	 to	 ISIS	 adherents	 in	 hopes	 of	 obtaining	 an	understanding	 of	 why	 the	 group	 perpetrates	 acts	 of	 terror.	 Shortly	 after	 establishing	contact,	her	 ISIS	 friends	dedicated	 “hours	each	day	with	her	on	Twitter,	 Skype	and	email,	painstakingly	 guiding	 her	 through	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 the	 faith”	 (Callimachi,	 2015).	 The	constant	 companionship,	 friendly	 relations,	 and	 receiving	 of	 gifts,	 accelerated	 her	conversion	to	Islam.	The	communication	facilitated	the	degeneration	of	her	identity,	as	she	increasingly	 associated	 with	 the	 group	 and	 indoctrinated	 Islamic	 extremist	 values.	 Alex	abandoned	her	former	reality	and	planned	travelling	through	Austria	to	the	“Muslim	Land”	with	her	 eleven-year-old	brother,	whom	would	 serve	 as	her	male	 escort	 (Ibid.).	Although	Alex	never	made	the	trip	as	a	result	of	timely	family	intervention,	her	story	illustrates	how	the	act	of	communication	assigns	new	meanings,	norms	and	values	to	one’s	identity.		
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The	establishment	of	a	connection	offers	 the	opportunity	 to	converse	and	exchange	 ideas,	information	 and	 values.	 Social	 media	 platforms	 are	 exceptionally	 suitable	 for	 initiating	contact	 between	 individuals	 separated	 by	 thousands	 of	 kilometers.	 The	 open	 channel	 of	communication	 allows	 for	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 recipient	 to	 be	 introduced	 to	 the	 radical	ideology	 and	 as	 dialogue	 ensues,	 the	 appeal	 of	 the	 identity	 offered	 intensifies.	 The	 act	 of	communication	is	essential	for	legitimizing	terrorist	organizations,	because	it	facilitates	the	deconstruction	of	the	respondent’s	socially	constructed	reality	and	in	turn,	implants	a	new	identity	in	accordance	to	the	interest	and	values	of	the	socializer	(Morris,	2015:	8).	Wendt	(1992:	 392)	 defines	 identities	 as	 “relatively	 stable,	 role-specific	 understandings	 and	expectations	 about	 the	 self”,	 accordingly	 causing	 one’s	 interests	 to	 be	 dependent	 on	 how	they	identify	themselves.	By	devoting	time	and	attention	to	the	subject,	the	socializer	aims	to	 redefine	 the	 identity	 and	 generate	 an	 intersubjective	 understanding	 of	 each	 other	 as	friends,	consequently	altering	the	behavior	of	the	respondent	(Ibid:	976).	In	the	case	of	Alex,	she	 started	 to	 wear	 a	 hijab,	 prey	 to	 Allah	 and	 listen	 to	 popular	 ISIS	 anthems	 in	 her	 car	(Callimachi,	 2015).	 In	 sum,	 the	 behavior	 indicates	 a	 change	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 the	environment,	abandonment	of	the	old	life,	and	adherence	to	a	new	identity	endorsed	by	ISIS	supporters.	
Whilst	 social	 media	 is	 a	 popular	 public	 diplomacy	 channel,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 only	 one.	Recruitment	hotbeds	 in	several	countries	have	emerged,	permitting	a	more	personal	 form	of	 mobilization	 to	 occur.	 Recruitment	 hotbeds	 consist	 of	 neighborhoods	 with	 close	 knit-groups,	in	which	a	momentum	of	mobilization	spreads	through	personal	contacts	from	one	group	to	another.	Examples	of	hotbeds	are	the	Moleenbeek	district	in	Brussels	and	Lisleby	neighborhood	 in	 Norway	 (The	 Soufan	 Group,	 2015:	 10).	 As	 such,	 people-to-people	diplomacy	facilitates	recruitment	as	“clusters	of	friends	and	neighbors	persuade	each	other	to	 travel	 separately	 or	 together	 to	 join	 the	 Islamic	 State”	 (Ibid.	 11).	 For	 instance,	 an	extremist	 Islamic	 organization	 in	 Brussels	 called	 ‘Sharia4Belgium’	 has	 radicalized	innumerable	young	men	and	sent	them	to	Syria	as	foreign	fighters.	One	example	is	Jejoen,	a	disheartened	Belgian	 teenager	 that	newly	 converted	 to	 Islam.	Through	 a	neighbor,	 Jejoen	was	 introduced	 to	 the	 group,	 fulfilling	 his	 need	 of	 finding	 a	 place	 of	 belonging	 and	companionship.	 He	 underwent	 an	 intensive	 four-week	 radicalization	 programme,	eventually	 leading	 to	his	departure	 for	 the	 Islamic	caliphate	(Bergen,	Schuster	&	Sterman,	2016:	8).	The	case	 illustrates	that	rather	than	being	recruited	via	social	media,	 Jejoen	was	radicalized	 through	 direct	 human	 contact	 and	 personal	 connections.	 In	 much	 the	 same	
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manner,	ISIS	supporters	reach	out	directly	to	lonely,	disillusioned	individuals	and	integrate	them	into	 their	community.	Through	relationship	building,	Muslim	extremist	groups	mold	individuals	 according	 to	 their	 values	 and	 construct	 the	 common	 identity	 necessary	 for	mobilization.		
As	repeatedly	exemplified,	 it	 is	most	 frequently	 the	disenchanted	youth	or	 individuals	not	fully	 embedded	 in	 their	 society	 of	 origin	 that	 are	 drawn	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 belonging	 and	purpose	 offered.	Without	 close	 ties	 to	 the	 community,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 ‘us	 versus	 them’	narrative	rooted	 in	 their	 identity,	making	 individuals	more	prone	 to	 the	public	diplomacy	exerted	by	 terrorist	organizations	and	to	radicalization	as	an	outcome	(Morris,	2015:	13).	The	 most	 active	 ISIS	 supporters	 are	 inspired	 to	 join	 the	 organization	 because	 of	 the	direction,	purpose,	identity	and	empowerment	it	provides	(Barrett,	2014:	9).	In	yet	another	example,	 three	British	female	teenagers	 from	Bethnal	Green	Academy	in	London	travelled	as	a	group	to	Syria,	shortly	after	a	classmate	had	also	done	so.	One	of	the	girls,	Amira,	before	her	 departure	 tweeted	 that	 she	 did	 not	 belong	 in	 this	 era	 and	 in	 the	 British	 society	(Bennhold,	2015).	The	 feeling	of	displacement	 likely	motivated	 the	girls	 to	 leave	 their	old	lives	 behind.	 Thus,	 the	 inclusiveness	 promoted	 by	 ISIS	 appears	 to	 prevail	 over	 the	 ties	recipients	 hold	 with	 their	 society	 of	 origin,	 encouraging	 them	 to	 desert	 their	 former	identities.		
ISIS	clearly	knows	who	their	audience	is	and	what	they	yearn	for,	thereby	shaping	its	public	diplomacy	 to	 precisely	 appeal	 to	 those	 needs.	 For	 instance,	 the	 video	 ‘There	 Is	 No	 Life	Without	 Jihad’	 released	 by	 Al-Ḥayāt	 depicts	 five	 foreign	 fighters	 promoting	 ISIS	 and	encouraging	their	“brothers”	at	home	to	join	the	jihad.	Abu	Bara	al-Hindi	from	Great	Britain	states,	“To	all	my	brothers	living	in	the	West,	I	know	how	you	feel.	I	used	to	live	there.	In	the	heart,	you	feel	depressed.	The	prophet	said	the	cure	for	depression	is	jihad	for	the	cause	of	Allah…	My	brothers	come	to	jihad	and	feel	the	honor	we	are	feeling.	Feel	the	happiness	we	are	 feeling”	 (ISIS,	 2014C).	 Numerous	 comparable	 videos	 featuring	 Western	 fighters	 are	circulating	 the	 Internet,	 calling	 upon	 their	 brothers	 to	 unite	 in	 the	 fight.	 The	 videos	 in	combination	with	two-way	dialogue	establish	an	attractive	public	diplomacy	campaign.	The	images	 and	 films	 are	 important	 for	 the	 pre-radicalization	 and	 self-identification	 stage	mentioned	 in	 the	 literature	 review,	 because	 they	 spark	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 sympathizers,	encouraging	 them	 to	 connect	 with	 ISIS	 supporters.	 Contrarily,	 the	 communication	facilitated	by	social	media	or	direct	interaction,	allow	the	indoctrination	phase	and	identity	
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reformation	process	to	occur	through	the	 internalization	of	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	values,	guiding	recipients	towards	jihadization	(Aly	et	al.,	2016:	4).		
ISIS	 also	 attracts	 self-appointed	 fanboys,	 who	 assist	 the	 organization	 in	 disseminating	messages	 by	 re-tweeting	 ISIS	 hashtags	 and	 translating	 content	 from	 Arabic	 to	 other	languages	(Ibid.).	The	followers	also	interact	with	each	other	and	adopt	a	common	identity	known	 as	 the	 ‘Baqiya	 family’,	 consisting	 of	 “a	 loose	 network	 of	 Islamic	 State	 supporters	from	 around	 the	 world	 who	 share	 news,	 develop	 close	 friendships,	 and	 help	 each	 other	when	members	get	arrested	or	come	under	law	enforcement	surveillance”	(Amarasimgam,	2015).	 When	 searching	 ‘Baqiya	 family’	 on	 Twitter,	 a	 myriad	 of	 supportive	 tweets	 and	references	in	favor	of	ISIS	appear.	In	an	interview,	Abu	Abdullah–	a	trusted	member	of	the	Baqiya	community	–affirmed,	“Trust	me,	I’ve	never	felt	like	I	belonged	anywhere	until	I	met	the	brothers	and	sisters	online…	Baqiya	Twitter	is	the	one	place	I	felt	at	home.	The	Internet	keeps	 us	 connected.	 Keeps	 us	 as	 a	 family”	 (Amarasingam,	 2015).	 When	 asked	 why	 the	amount	 of	 time	 and	 effort	 was	 dedicated	 to	 diffusing	 information,	 one	 Baqiya	 family	member	responded,	“It	is	our	obligation	to	call	people	to	our	cause	and	explain	it	to	them”	(Ibid.).	The	statements	confirm	the	importance	of	a	common	identity	in	appealing	to	foreign	audiences	and	how	the	establishment	of	favorable	intersubjective	understanding	influences	behavior.		
Despite	 the	 majority	 of	 radicalized	 individuals	 supporting	 ISIS	 to	 fulfill	 their	 need	 of	belonging,	 others	 join	 the	 cause	 due	 to	 boredom	 and	 in	 search	 of	 action	 or	 purpose.	Knowing	 this,	 ISIS	also	brands	 its	 image	 to	appeal	 to	 thrill	 seekers,	defined	as	 individuals	that	want	to	prove	their	worth	by	surviving	a	threatening	adventure	and	are	“in	 it	 for	the	opportunity	 to	 engage	 in	 action	while	 enjoying	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 impunity	 for	 their	 acts”	(Quantum,	 2015:	 2.).	 ISIS	 (2014D)	 modifies	 its	 public	 diplomacy	 campaign	 to	 reach	 the	targeted	population	as	shown	by	the	recruitment	video	featuring	scenes	 from	the	popular	video	game,	GTA	V,	with	the	principal	message	being	that	fighting	on	the	battlefield	for	ISIS	is	 a	 real-life	 video	 game.	 British	 foreign	 fighter,	 Abu	 Sumayyah	 al-Britani,	 tweeted	 “It’s	actually	 quite	 fun…	 It’s	 better	 than	 that	 game	Call	 of	Duty.	 It’s	 like	 that,	 but	 in	 3D	where	everything	is	happening	in	front	of	you”	(Klausen,	2015:	4).	Consequently,	“the	group’s	slick	videos	 and	 social	 media	 campaigns	 attract	 even	 young	 Sunnis	 who	 lack	 real	 religious	knowledge	or	conviction	by	playing	into	their	desires	for	adventure	and	a	sense	of	purpose”	(Byman,	2016:	80).	Although	such	videos	at	first	glance	appear	to	be	a	page	straight	out	of	
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the	propaganda	handbook,	it	encourages	interested	individuals	to	seek	contact,	permitting	strategic	communication	to	follow.		
Several	 of	 the	 foreign	 followers	 mobilized	 by	 ISIS	 become	 active	 public	 diplomacy	participants	 themselves	by	promoting	 the	cause	and	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 ideology.	The	aforementioned	video	of	foreign	fighters	calling	their	brothers	to	come	join	them	serves	an	example	of	a	public	diplomacy	recipient	transforming	into	an	agent.	In	another	example,	a	Dutch	 jihadi,	 Israfil	 Yilmaz,	 opened	 the	 “Ask	 A	 Jihadi”	 blog	 on	 Tumblr	 through	which	 he	answers	 questions	 regarding	 life	 in	 the	 caliphate,	 current	 events,	 and	 comments	 on	critiques	of	ISIS	on	both	moral	and	religious	grounds	(Hall,	2015).	Likewise,	the	outsourcing	of	branding	and	public	diplomacy	to	self-appointed	fans,	demonstrates	how	actors	drawn	to	the	cause	become	advertisers.		
Proselytizing	information	on	a	voluntary	basis	also	hints	at	the	significant	soft	power	held	by	the	jihadist	group.	“In	this	world,	the	counterculture	is	conservative.	Islam	is	punk	rock.	The	headscarf	is	liberating.	And	beards	are	sexy”	(Bennhold,	2015).	The	brand	and	culture	endorsed	 by	 ISIS	 is	 found	 immensely	 alluring.	 Several	 young,	moderate	Muslims	want	 to	join	the	cause	and	help	spread	Islamic	fundamentalist	values.	Thus,	the	targeted	audience	of	ISIS’s	public	diplomacy	 campaign	appears	 to	want	what	 ISIS	wants	 and	are	 attracted,	not	coerced	 into	 supporting	 the	 organization	 (Nye,	 2008:	 95).	 In	 her	 blog	 post	 ‘Jihadi-cool’,	Bintchaos	 (2015B)	describes	 the	sources	of	 ISIS’s	 soft	power.	She	says,	 “Jihadis	 look	cool–	like	ninjas	or	video	game	warriors–	gangstah	and	 thuggish	even…	 [They	are]	 the	voice	of	youth	counterculture	and	revolution	 for	an	underclass.		Like	ghetto	culture	 in	 the	US–	 the	inexorable	evolution	of	cool”.	She	additionally	states	 that	 the	 ISIS	has	 “cool”	weapons	and	
nasheeds2.	Although	the	term	‘Jihadi-cool’	has	existed	for	some	time,	ISIS	takes	the	concept	to	 a	 whole	 new	 level	 through	 its	 Hollywood-style	 videos	 and	 merchandising	 extremes,	exemplified	 by	 the	 selling	 of	 ISIS	 themed	 T-shirts	 (Picart,	 2015:	 362).	 Moreover,	 social	media	 sites	 like	 Twitter,	 Facebook,	 Tumblr	 and	 Instagram	 are	 swarming	with	 pictures	 of	small	children	wearing	ISIS	fan	gear,	similar	to	how	one	dresses	a	child	in	a	football	jersey	to	 show	support	 for	 a	 team	(Klausen,	2015:	17).	The	 culture,	 values	and	even	violence	of	ISIS	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 attractive,	 thereby	 encouraging	 self-radicalization	 and	indoctrination	of	the	Islamic	fundamentalist	ideology.																																																										2	Chants	or	music	sung	a	capella,	which	often	reference	Islamic	religious	values,	history,	and	current	events	(Raudvere	&	Stenberg,	2008:	76).		
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Since	 its	 rise,	 ISIS	 has	 obtained	 significant	 foreign	 support	 and	 its	 convincing	 public	diplomacy	crusade	likely	played	a	role	 in	this.	Although	it	 is	not	possible	to	conclude	with	certainty	 that	 the	 organization’s	 public	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 cause,	 the	 number	 of	 global	followers	suggests	that	the	branding	at	least	should	have	increased	ISIS’s	attractiveness.	For	instance,	a	quantitative	study	by	Berger	and	Morgan	(2015)	on	 the	use	of	Twitter	by	 ISIS	followers	discovered	that	from	September	to	December	2014,	between	46,000	and	90,000	Twitter	accounts	were	actively	disseminating	 information	on	behalf	of	 ISIS.	A	comparable	study	 collected	 3.9	 million	 tweets	 between	 October	 and	 December	 2014	 favorably	mentioning	ISIS	(Magdy,	Darwish	&	Weber,	2015).	Moreover,	as	aforementioned,	abundant	self-proclaimed	 fans	 assist	 ISIS	 in	 re-tweeting	 and	 circulating	 videos,	 images,	 and	information;	 thus	 considerably	 increasing	 the	 distance	 messages	 are	 transmitted.	 The	enthusiasts	 are	 waging	 their	 jihad	 via	 the	 Internet	 (Winter,	 2015:	 37).	 Accordingly,	 the	massive	presence	of	ISIS	keyboard	warriors	suggests	a	strong	support	base	for	the	group.			
The	 large	 number	 of	 pro-ISIS	 demonstrations	 held	worldwide	also	 exposes	 external	 encouragement	 for	ISIS.	Several	countries	have	experienced	a	protest	or	rally	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 jihadist	 group.	 Some	 examples	include	the	United	Kingdom,	Australia,	Indonesia,	the	Netherlands,	 and	 Belgium.	 The	 protests	 divulge	widespread	 popular	 support	 for	 ISIS	 in	 foreign	societies,	 which	 may	 be	 attracted	 to	 the	 public	diplomacy	 exerted	 by	 the	 jihadist	 organization.	
Figure	 3	depicts	 the	 pro-ISIS	 demonstration	 held	 in	The	 Hague	 on	 July	 4th	 2014	 and	 Figure	 4	 shows	 a	popular	 meme	 circulating	 the	 Internet	 of	 a	 protest	held	in	London	in	favor	of	the	terrorist	organization.		
Whilst	 some	 supporters	 wage	 their	 jihad	 via	 the	Internet,	 others	 travel	 to	 the	 caliphate	 to	 physically	 support	 the	 cause.	 From	 Western	Europe	 alone,	 approximately	 5,000	 individuals	 traveled	 to	 Syria.	 3,500	 out	 of	 the	 5,000	European	 foreign	 fighters	 come	 from	 four	 EU	member	 states,	 namely	 France,	 the	 United	Kingdom,	 Germany	 and	 Belgium	 (The	 Soufan	 group,	 2015:	 12).	 As	 of	 September	 2015,	
Figure	4.	Source:	Winsor	(2014),	Business	Insider	Australia		
Figure	3.	Source:	van	den	Ijssel	(2014),	Den	Haag	FM		
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roughly	 150	American	 and	130	Canadians	 left	 for	 Syria	 (Ibid:	 20).	Never	 in	 history	has	 a	conflict	 attracted	 so	many	Western	 civilians	 to	 support	 and	 join	 a	 cause	 in	 such	 a	 short	period	 of	 time	 (Alkhouri	 &	 Kohlmann,	 2014:	 2).	 The	 current	 total	 estimated	 number	 of	foreign	fighters	in	Syria	is	30,000	from	86	countries	and	the	majority	is	predicted	to	be	ISIS	advocates	 (Ibid:	4).	One	year	 earlier,	 the	estimated	number	of	 global	 foreign	 fighters	was	12,000	from	81	countries.	The	substantial	rise	in	foreign	nationals	combating	in	Syria	may	to	some	degree	be	attributed	to	the	sophisticated	public	diplomacy	campaign.	Although	the	precise	effect	public	diplomacy	had	on	the	upsurge	in	foreign	fighters	is	almost	impossible	to	empirically	conclude,	it	can	be	argued	that	ISIS	was	able	to	deconstruct	several	identities	and	establish	shared	understanding	based	on	the	Islamic	fundamentalist	ideology.			
To	 sum	 up,	 it	 is	 incontestable	 that	 ISIS	 heavily	 invests	 in	 increasing	 its	 attractiveness	abroad.	 ‘The	 purpose	 of	 the	 seemingly	 innocuous	 tweeting	 of	 cat	 pictures	 and	 hanging	around	with	 friends,	 blended	with	 staggering	 depictions	 of	 brutality,	 is	 to	 drill	 home	one	message:	 You	 belong	with	 us	 because	 jihad	 is	 an	 individual	 obligation	 for	 every	Muslim”	(Klausen,	 2015:	 19).	 Similarly,	 the	 distribution	 of	 high-quality	 videos,	 images	 of	 a	welcoming	brotherhood,	and	clips	of	adventurous	video	game-style	 combat,	 appeal	 to	 the	emotions	of	the	intended	respondents	and	inspire	them	to	learn	more	about	the	group.	The	supreme	 channel	 of	 communication	 for	 public	 diplomacy	 purposes	 appears	 to	 be	 social	media,	 as	 it	 facilitates	 sufficient	 two-way	 dialogue	 with	 the	 intended	 audience,	 whilst	allowing	a	degree	of	anonymity	 to	be	maintained.	Once	 initial	 contact	 is	 formed,	 strategic	engagement	and	relationship	building	follows.	Repeated	interaction	transforms	the	identity	in	 line	with	 the	views	of	 ISIS.	The	 following	 section	 illuminates	 the	 role	public	diplomacy	played	 in	 two	specific	events	of	 terrorism	 in	 the	EU–	 the	November	2015	attacks	 in	Paris	and	March	2016	blasts	in	Brussels.		
6.2	Public	Diplomacy	in	the	2015	Paris	and	2016	Brussels	Attacks	In	November	2015,	civilians	at	several	strategically	selected	locations	in	Paris,	namely	Stade	de	France,	crowded	bars	and	cafés,	and	the	Bataclan	Theatre,	were	indiscriminately	sprayed	with	bullets	(Giroux	&	Evans,	2016:	232).	Four	months	later,	suicide	bombers	exploded	at	Maelbeek	 metro	 station	 and	 Zaventum	 airport	 in	 Brussels,	 practically	 and	 symbolically	piercing	the	heart	of	the	EU.	The	violent	incidents	demonstrate	the	ability	of	ISIS	to	prepare	and	execute	highly	coordinated	strikes	overseas.	Due	to	the	interconnectivity	of	the	attacks,	
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the	events	are	discussed	jointly.	When	inspecting	the	ISIS	fanatics	behind	the	attacks	in	both	European	capitals,	a	striking	feature	is	the	European	nationality	held	by	the	majority	of	the	perpetrators,	 whom	 appear	 to	 have	 recently	 returned	 from	 the	 caliphate	 undetected.	Considering	 the	 men	 are	 of	 European	 origin,	 it	 is	 questioned:	 why	 and	 how	 have	 the	jihadists	radicalized	to	the	degree	of	willing	to	sacrifice	their	lives	for	the	cause?	Although	it	is	 not	 possible	 to	 answer	 the	 question	with	 certainty,	 a	 theoretical	 case	 is	made	 that	 the	perpetrators	 likely	were	 charmed	 by	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 campaign	 and	 interacted	with	ISIS	zealots	prior	to	radicalization.	Hence,	the	section	starts	with	an	examination	of	the	men	responsible	for	the	terror.	
In	the	case	of	Paris,	 ten,	young	males	committed	the	acts	of	 terrorism,	whilst	 the	Brussels	bombings	was	the	result	of	three	suicide	attackers.	Several	of	the	perpetrators	are	of	French	and	Belgian	nationality	and	allegedly	became	radicalized	relatively	recently.	In	fact,	all	but	two	 of	 the	 Paris	 attackers	 were	 Belgian	 or	 French.	 Little	 is	 known	 about	 the	 two	 non-European	 aggressors,	 because	 they	 entered	 the	 continent	 through	 Greece	 on	 a	 fake	passport,	 most	 probably	 masking	 as	 refugees	 (BBC	 News,	 2016).	 Likewise,	 two	 of	 the	Brussels	 bombers	 were	 Belgian	 born,	 namely	 brothers	 Ibrahim	 and	 Khalid	 El-Bakraoui,	while	Najim	 Laachraoui	 origins	 from	Morocco	 but	was	 raised	 in	 Brussels	 (Barker,	 2016).	Moreover,	 all	 perpetrators,	 except	 Ibrahim	El-Bakraoui,	 are	 returned	 foreign	 fighters	 (Al-Hlou,	2016).	
Interestingly,	 some	 of	 the	 Paris	 combatants	 were	 not	 previously	 characterized	 by	acquaintances	as	radical	Muslims.	For	instance,	brothers	Saleh	and	Ibrahim	Abdeslam	were	regularly	witnessed	consuming	alcohol,	drugs	and	cigarettes.	Furthermore,	Ibrahim	owned	the	 bar	 ‘Les	 Beguines’	 in	 Molenbeek,	 which	 Saleh	 supposedly	 co-managed.	 The	 bar	 was	shutdown	 by	 police	 due	 to	 frequent	 customer	 use	 of	 marijuana	 and	 hallucinogens	 (BBC,	2016B).	 Eight	 months	 prior	 to	 the	 terrorist	 attacks,	 the	 brothers	 were	 filmed	 partying,	drinking	 and	 smoking	 in	 a	 nightclub	 (CBS,	 2016).	 The	 footage	 suggests	 that	 the	radicalization	 was	 fairly	 recent,	 as	 ISIS	 prohibits	 alcohol	 and	 cigarettes.	 The	 flat	 tenant	above	Abdeslam’s	bar	avowed,	“On	Fridays,	they	would	stay	smoking	on	the	terrace.	I	never	saw	 them	 at	 the	 mosque"	 (BBCB,	 2016).	 Similarly,	 Ibrahim’s	 ex-wife	 stated,	 “his	 parents	practically	 had	 to	 force	 him	 to	 participate	 in	 Ramadan”	 (Roberts,	 2015).	 The	 statements	validate	 the	 brothers	 previously	 did	 not	 adhere	 to	 extremist,	 Islamic	 values.	 Similarly,	Abdelhamid	Abaaoud,	the	lynchpin	behind	the	Paris	attacks,	came	from	a	moderate	Muslim	
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family.	His	older	sister,	Yasmina,	expressed	shock	in	her	brother’s	sudden	radicalization,	as	he	never	articulated	interest	in	Islam	prior	to	his	departure	to	Syria	and	purportedly	never	visited	a	mosque	(Higgins,	2015).	Due	to	time	constraints,	it	is	not	possible	to	discuss	all	the	perpetrators	 in	 depth,	 but	 excluding	 the	 two	 unknown	men;	 it	 appears	 that	 none	 of	 the	Paris	attackers	were	from	extremist	families.	Consequently,	radical	socialization	must	have	occurred	to	transform	the	moderate	Muslims	into	fanatic	militants.		
The	Belgian	nationals	responsible	for	the	Paris	and	Brussels	attacks	are	all	connected	with	the	Molenbeek	district	in	Brussels,	one	of	the	city’s	disadvantaged	neighborhoods.	In	recent	years,	 several	 underprivileged	 areas	 in	 Brussels	 occupied	 predominantly	 by	 migrants	drastically	 deteriorated	 because	 of	 neglect	 by	 the	 Belgian	 society	 and	 government,	 rising	feelings	 of	 alienation	 and	 marginalization	 amongst	 inhabitants.	 Terrorist	 organizations	exploit	the	stigmatization	to	mobilize	foreign	support	(Maher	&	Neuman,	2016).	According	to	 experts	 at	 the	 ICSR,	 Belgium	 is	 exceptionally	 prone	 to	 jihadist	 terrorism	 due	 to	 a	“longstanding	 and	 well-organized	 network	 of	 radical	 Islamist	 recruiters”	 harboring	 in	disadvantaged	districts	(Ibid.).	Furthermore,	Belgian	police	forces	are	ill	equipped	to	deter	jihadist	recruitment	and	counter	the	surge	of	radicalization,	particularly	because	they	lack	the	manpower	 to	monitor	all	potential	 threats	 (Ibid.).	As	 the	Belgian	perpetrators	of	both	terrorist	 attacks	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 district,	 it	 is	 determined	 that	 the	 characterization	 of	Molenbeek	 as	 a	 terrorist	 hotbed	 is	 significantly	 accurate.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	acknowledge	that	Molenbeek	is	not	the	only	hotbed	neighborhood	in	Brussels,	but	the	most	frequently	mentioned	(Higgins,	2015).		
The	association	with	terrorist	breeding	grounds	and	connections	between	the	perpetrators	in	both	attacks	suggests	the	men	were	at	 least	partly	radicalized	by	direct	 interaction.	For	instance,	close	ties	existed	between	the	Abdeslam	brothers	and	Abdelhamid	Abaaoud	prior	to	the	attacks.	Saleh	and	Abdelhamid	were	arrested	together	in	2010	for	attempted	robbery	(van	 Vlierden,	 2015).	 Additionally,	 Bilal	 Hafdi,	 the	 youngest	 amongst	 the	 Paris	 attackers,	belonged	 to	 the	 same	 clique	of	 friends	 (Oving,	 2015).	 Interestingly,	 the	Brussels	bombers	were	also	interlinked	with	the	attackers	in	Paris.	Khalid	El-Bakraoui	rented	the	apartment	where	 the	 jihadis	 in	 Paris	 were	 residing.	 Furthermore,	 Najim	 Laachraoui	 is	 suspected	 to	have	constructed	the	explosive	belts	detonated	during	the	Paris	attacks,	evidenced	by	DNA	found	on	 the	 suicide	 vests.	 Also,	Najim	 is	 connected	 to	 Saleh	Abdeslam,	 as	 the	men	were	witnessed	 travelling	 together	 in	 September	 2015	 at	 the	 border	 between	 Austria	 and	
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Hungry.	 Fingerprints	 of	 both	 men	 were	 uncovered	 at	 a	 safe	 house	 in	 Auvelais	 and	Schaarbeek	 (Buchanen	 &	 Park,	 2016).	 The	 existing	 relationships	 insinuate	 a	 more	traditional	 form	of	public	diplomacy	occurred,	 “in	which	direct	 relations	are	pursued…	 to	advance	the	interests	and	extend	the	values	of	those	being	represented”	(Sharp,	2005:	106).	Jihadist	 recruiters	 use	 their	 social	 networks	 to	 physically	 endorse	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	values	 and	 encourage	 friends	 and	 family	 to	 join	 the	 cause,	 resulting	 in	 two-way	 dialogue	between	 promoters	 and	 recipients.	 According	 to	 Atran,	 a	 researcher	 from	 Oxford	University,	 friends	and	peers	persuaded	 three	quarters	of	 the	 individuals	 joining	 ISIS	and	family	members	recruited	an	additional	twenty	percent	(RT,	2015).		
“Islamic	radicals”	consisting	of	“young	men	involved	in	petty	crime,	who	were	radical	before	they	were	religious,	and	whose	violent	respect-through-fear	credo	was	later	legitimized	by	the	 Islamic	 State”,	 characterizes	 several	 of	 the	 terrorists	 (van	 Vlierden,	 2015).	 Almost	 all	men	have	existing	records	at	the	police	for	previous	criminal	convictions,	such	as	the	armed	robbery	 committed	by	Abdeslam	and	Abaaoud.	 Similarly,	 Ibrahim	and	Khalid	El-Bakraoui	spent	 time	 in	 prison	 for	 car	 jacking,	 armed	 robbery,	 and	 shooting	 at	 police	 with	 a	Kalashnikov	 (Al-Hlou,	 2016).	 Moreover,	 the	 attackers	 also	 fit	 the	 profile	 of	 marginalized	men,	 seeking	 for	 a	 place	 of	 belonging	 and	 purpose.	 In	 interviews,	 families	 of	 the	perpetrators	described	their	children	as	feeling	like	outsiders.	 In	one	instance,	the	mother	of	Bilal	Hadfi	on	Maghreb	TV	claimed	her	son	felt	unwelcome	in	the	Belgian	society	and	“fell	victim	to	the	stereotype	assigned	to	boys	like	him.	The	society	pushed	him	to	the	sidelines,	where	 he	 was	 indoctrinated	 and	 manipulated"	 (Rens,	 2015).	 Thus,	 the	 men	 likely	 were	allured	to	the	brand	exerted	by	ISIS	and	felt	encouraged	to	establish	connections	with	other	supporters,	 guiding	 their	 radicalization	 through	 interaction.	 Once	 radicalized,	 the	 men	induced	friends	and	family	to	support	the	group	and	travel	to	Syria.	For	example,	Abaaoud	persuaded	associates	to	join	the	jihad,	including	his	thirteen-year	old	brother	Younes,	who	is	the	youngest	known	foreign	fighter	(van	Vlierden,	2015).	It	is	believed	that	the	Abdeslam	brothers	and	Hafdi	also	were	inspired	by	the	video	footage	of	Abaaoud	in	the	caliphate	and	followed	his	lead	(Oving,	2015).	
The	 video	 “Kill	 Them	Wherever	 You	 Find	 Them”	 (ISIS,	 2016A)	 released	 after	 the	 violent	assaults	 in	 Paris,	 features	 nine	 out	 the	 ten	 perpetrators.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 video	 is	 to	reveal	"the	final	messages	of	 the	nine	 lions	of	 the	khilafah	who	were	mobilized	from	their	dens	 to	bring	an	entire	 country–	France	–to	her	knees",	 as	 stated	 in	 the	 film.	The	 footage	
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depicts	 the	men	 engaging	 in	 target	 practice	 and	 relentlessly	 executing	 prisoners,	 thereby	glorifying	them	for	their	sacrifice.	Each	of	the	‘lions’	provides	a	message	to	the	disbelievers	and	 the	 Muslims	 who	 stayed	 behind.	 For	 the	 nonbelievers	 or	 kuffar,	 the	 messages	predominantly	revolve	around	warning	civilians	that	the	war	has	just	begun	and	suffering	will	be	conveyed	to	the	countries	launching	airstrikes.	Contrarily,	for	Muslims	living	in	the	West,	they	request	them	to	wakeup,	“reflect	and	renew	your	intentions”	in	the	fight	against	the	kuffar	before	it	is	too	late.		
Whilst	 the	 videos	 themselves	 may	 be	 used	 to	 recruit	 potential	 new	 members,	 they	 also	provide	 evidence	 to	 the	 potential	 role	 public	 diplomacy	 played	 in	 the	 terrorist	 attacks.	Throughout	 the	 video,	 a	 clear	 ‘us	 versus	 them’	 narrative	 is	 expressed.	 By	 urging	 fellow	Muslim	 “brothers	 and	 sisters”	 to	 travel	 to	 the	 caliphate	 and	 join	 them	 in	 their	 battle,	 it	becomes	increasingly	apparent	that	the	foreign	fighters	adopted	a	common	identity	based	on	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 values,	 which	 are	 repeatedly	 rehearsed	 throughout	 the	 video.	Due	 to	 the	 film	 having	 been	 taped	 inside	 the	 caliphate,	 it	 is	 undeniable	 that	 the	 men	migrated	to	Syria,	where	they	received	training	and	participated	in	the	preparations	of	the	attacks.	Hence,	 not	 only	must	 the	 jihadist	 organization	have	had	 significant	 soft	 power	 in	enticing	 the	bombers	 to	 travel	 to	 ISIS	 territory,	 but	 also	 interaction	with	 group	members	should	 have	 taken	 place	 prior	 to	 departure.	 Additionally,	 the	 people	 of	 France	 are	dehumanized	 and	 defined	 as	 the	 enemy	 in	 the	 video,	 clearly	 demonstrating	 a	 process	 of	‘othering’.	For	example,	Abu	Qital	al-Faransi–	the	nom-de-guerre	of	Samy	Amimour	–averred	to	the	Muslim	population	in	France,	“By	Allah,	I	ask	myself	what	you	are	doing	there…	living	among	them,	sleeping	among	them,	eating	with	them,	with	these	disbelievers…	if	you	cant	find	a	weapon–	smash	their	heads	with	a	rock”	(ISIS,	2016).	The	declaration	documents	the	polarization	of	identities	and	the	interests	to	bring	terror	to	the	people	of	France.		
The	 previous	 section	 explained	 how	 public	 diplomacy	 facilitates	 the	 breaking	 down	 of	existing	 identities	 and	 using	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 ideology	 to	 mold	 an	 individual	 in	adopting	 a	 new	 socially	 constructed	 reality.	 As	 the	 attackers	were	 impressionable,	 young	men	from	moderate	families,	it	is	extremely	likely	they	were	subjugated	to	radicalization	by	ISIS’s	 public	 diplomacy	 campaign,	 especially	 as	 they	 voyaged	 to	 Syria	 where	 they	transformed	 into	 fully	 integrated	 members	 of	 the	 group.	 Additionally,	 the	 beheadings	 of	prisoners	 as	 seen	 in	 the	 video	 desensitized	 the	 attackers	 to	 violence.	 The	 willingness	 to	
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sacrifice	ones	life	for	the	cause	evidences	that	ISIS	won	the	hearts	and	minds	of	the	young	men.		
As	a	direct	consequence	of	 the	military	 intervention	against	 ISIS,	 the	 jihadist	organization	allegedly	 weakened	 significantly.	 To	 counter	 the	 narrative	 of	 power	 deterioration,	 ISIS	prepares	 and	 executes	 acts	 of	 terrorism	 on	 unsuspecting	 civilians,	 demonstrating	 the	organization	 is	not	defeated.	 In	 fact,	several	 tweets	 following	the	attacks	acknowledge	the	airstrikes	 against	 the	 group	and	 the	killing	of	Muslims	worldwide.	 For	 example,	@ev8_ho	tweeted:	“The	west	used	to	live	quietly	and	set	fire	in	the	Muslim	lands	with	war,	but	after	the	 emergence	 of	 the	 caliphate	 the	 game	 has	 changed	 #Franceisonfire	 #Paris”.	 Another	advocate	 published:	 “After	 the	 French	 crimes	 in	Mali,	 and	 the	 bombing	 of	 Syria	 and	 Iraq,	now	 comes	 the	 killing.	 In	 your	 homes	 there	 will	 be	 war…	 #Paris	 #ISIS”	 (King,	 2015).		Additionally,	 coordinated	 onslaughts	 permit	 ISIS	 to	 “gain	 leverage	 over	 al-Qaeda	 in	 the	competition	 for	 people,	 resources	 and	 visibility”	 (Chauzel	 et	 al.,	 2015:	 4).	 Thus,	 acts	 of	terrorism	 on	 foreign	 soil	 entail	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 function	 of	 placing	 ISIS	 back	 on	 the	radar	of	sympathizers.	The	Internet	is	flooded	with	hundreds	and	thousands	of	appraising	tweets,	 videos,	 and	 images	 shortly	 after	 the	 attacks,	 indicating	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 large	support	 base	 (Lawrence	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Examples	 of	 two	 pro-ISIS	 tweets	 succeeding	 the	attacks	are	found	below:	
The	 media	 circus	 following	 the	 attacks	 permits	 ISIS	 to	 tactically	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	momentum	for	disseminating	materials,	including	videos	urging	Muslims	to	join	the	cause.	
Figures	5	and	6.	Source:	Millière	(2016).	
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To	illustrate,	ISIS	(2014E)	re-launched	its	‘What	Are	You	Waiting	For?’	campaign	after	Paris.	As	hinted	by	the	title,	the	content	persuades	French	nationals	to	make	Hijra	to	the	caliphate	and	if	for	whatever	reasons	the	passage	is	unfeasible,	to	carry	out	the	jihad	against	kuffar	at	home.	The	video	ends	with	the	symbolic	burning	of	passports.	Redistribution	of	 the	video	likely	 occurred	 for	 celebratory	 purposes	 in	 addition	 to	 illustrating	 the	 fulfilling	 of	 the	promise	 to	 bring	 terror	 to	 France.	 A	 comparable	 commemorative	 video	 followed	 the	Brussels	bombings,	called	 ‘The	Exile	of	 Islam	and	Brussels	Attacks’	(ISIS,	2016B).	Brothers	are	invigorated	to	rise	up	and	claim	their	victory	in	the	war	against	disbelievers.	Thus,	both	attacks	were	incorporated	in	the	public	diplomacy	campaign,	persuading	Muslims	to	follow	by	example.			
To	 sum	 up,	 the	 attackers	 likely	 were	 influenced	 by	 ISIS’s	 public	 diplomacy	 campaign,	because	it	provides	a	sense	of	belonging,	purpose	and	adventure.	The	radicalization	of	the	European	 attackers	 appears	 to	 be	 recent,	 most	 probably	 through	 personal	 contacts.	 The	interaction	with	other	ISIS	adherents	and	time	spent	in	the	caliphate	facilitates	the	adoption	of	 a	 common	 identity,	 internalization	 of	 fundamentalist	 values	 and	 polarization	 of	Westerners	 as	 the	 enemy.	 As	 identity	 influences	 behavior,	 the	 factors	 likely	 encouraged	attacks	 on	 European	 soil,	which	 themselves	 became	 integrated	 into	 the	 public	 diplomacy	exerted	by	ISIS.	The	publicity	of	the	terrorism	as	well	as	the	appraisal	of	supporters	globally	promotes	the	organization	and	its	cause	to	sympathizers,	 inspiring	them	to	reach	out.	The	following	 section	 analyzes	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 of	 AQIM	 to	 determine	 whether	 other	jihadist	groups	use	analogous	strategies.		
7 . 	 T h e 	 S t r a t e g i c 	 U s e 	 o f 	 P u b l i c 	 D i p l o m a c y 	 B y 	 A Q I M 	7.1	Public	Diplomacy	via	Direct	Interaction	and	Embedment		
AQIM	is	the	North	African	offshoot	of	al-Qaeda.	An	al-Qaeda	affiliate	is	defined	as	a	terrorist	organization	 whose	 leadership	 has	 sworn	 allegiance	 to	 Ayman	 al-Zawahiri,	 whilst	remaining	 structurally	 separate	 (Byman,	 2014:	 434).	 AQIM	 became	 an	 official	 branch	 in	2006	and	adopted	the	‘al-Qaeda’	name.	Prior	to	the	merge,	the	Salafist	Group	for	Preaching	and	 Combat	 (GSPC),	 as	 the	 group	 was	 formerly	 known,	 mainly	 focused	 on	 a	 national	struggle	 for	 power	 in	 Algeria.	 In	 fact,	 the	 organization	 originated	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	marginalization	 of	 political	 Islamic	 organizations	 during	 the	 1990s,	 but	 currently	 aims	 to	exert	its	control	beyond	Algerian	borders	(Detzi	&	Winkleman,	2015:	230).		
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The	mariage	de	 raison	 with	 al-Qaeda	 permitted	 AQIM	 to	 reestablish	 itself	 as	 a	 regionally	significant	 group	 rather	 than	 merely	 national	 challengers	 to	 the	 Algerian	 government.	Moreover,	 the	 embrace	 of	 al-Qaeda’s	 name	 brought	 prominent	 branding	 advantages:	 it	enabled	 AQIM	 to	 portray	 itself	 as	 powerful	 and	 globally	 relevant	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 local,	Maghreb	communities,	more	so	than	it	realistically	was	at	the	time	(Bøås	&	Torheim,	2013:	1287).	AQIM	leader	Abdelmalek	Droukdel	confirms	the	enlargement	during	an	interview	by	stating,	“We	were	able	to	transfer	our	jihad	from	the	country	to	regional,	and	we	were	able	to	expand	our	activity	to	the	Maghreb	states	and	the	African	coast”	(NYTimes,	2008).	Since	fusing	 with	 al-Qaeda,	 AQIM’s	 regional	 power	 projection	 capabilities	 strengthened	immensely,	 with	 the	 foremost	 countries	 under	 its	 influence	 (in	 varying	 degrees)	 being	Algeria,	Mali,	 Niger,	Mauritania,	 Libya,	 Senegal,	 Chad,	 Tunisia,	Morocco	 and	Nigeria	 (BBC,	2013).	However,	because	of	its	history,	AQIM	remains	a	predominantly	Algerian-controlled	organization	 that	 seeks	 to	 establish	 an	 Islamic	 caliphate	 in	 the	 Sahel	 and	 uses	 public	diplomacy	to	increase	attractiveness	(Pham,	2011:	40).		
As	 a	means	 to	 analyze	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 exerted	 by	 AQIM	 and	 how	 it	 competes	with	international	 organizations	 like	 ISIS,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	 ascertain	 who	 the	 organization’s	intended	public	diplomacy	audience	 is,	what	 its	underlying	brand	entails,	and	the	method	utilized	 to	reach	 the	recipients.	Starting	with	 the	 intended	audience,	statements	 issued	by	the	 organization	 indicate	 that	 AQIM	 rallies	 support	 regionally	 in	 the	 Sahara	 and	internationally	 via	 Diasporas	 and	 online	 platforms.	 For	 example,	 Droukdel	 alleges,	 “In	Mauritania,	Morocco	and	Tunisia	we	see	Muslim	youths	who	support	our	matter,	 they	are	ready	to	sacrifice	themselves	and	their	money	for	the	sake	of	supporting	Islam”	(NYTimes,	2008).	 Whereas	 in	 response	 to	 French	 involvement	 in	 Mali,	 head	 of	 AQIM	 media	 Abu	Abdullah	Ahmed,	calls	all	“Muslims	to	target	France	and	its	interests	and	subjects	inside	and	outside	France	until	it	withdraws	the	last	soldier	from	the	land	of	the	Muslims	and	lifts	its	support	 for	 rulers	 of	 the	 region	 who	 oppress	 their	 people”	 (Counter	 Extremism	 Project,	2016:	 26).	 The	declarations	 imply	 that	AQIM	endeavors	 to	 influence	 audiences	 both	near	and	 far.	Throughout	 the	 section,	 the	 term	 ‘local’	 is	 applied	 to	 characterize	 foreign	publics	residing	in	the	region,	whereas	‘international’	refers	to	populations	outside	of	North	Africa.				
Like	ISIS,	the	jihadist	group	calls	for	fellow	Muslims	worldwide,	with	a	special	emphasis	on	France,	 to	 rise	up	against	nonbelievers.	When	 formalizing	affiliation	with	al-Qaeda,	 it	was	anticipated	that	the	admission	would	supply	AQIM	with	a	globalist	boost.	When	al-Zawahiri	
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publically	announced	the	association,	he	affirmed,	“This	blessed	union	will	be	a	bone	in	the	throat	of	 the	American	and	French	 crusaders”,	 revealing	 international	 expectations	of	 the	Algerian-rooted	group	(Pham,	2011:	39).	Despite	prospects,	the	agenda	of	the	organization	tends	 to	 focus	 more	 on	 local	 and	 regional	 conflicts	 and	 interests.	 For	 example,	 AQIM	regularly	abducts	foreign	civilians	and	journalists	and	instead	of	requesting	for	an	exchange	of	jihadist	prisoners	held	by	the	West	or	executing	the	abductee	for	international	publicity,	the	organization	almost	exclusively	demands	ransoms	for	the	release	of	hostages	(Torres-Soriano,	 2016:	 4).	 The	 actions	 insinuate	 that	 AQIM	 prioritizes	 its	 own	 funding	 and	capabilities	 over	 the	 global	 jihadist	 fight.	 Thus,	 the	 organization	 appears	 less	 concerned	about	promoting	its	values	via	public	diplomacy	to	an	international	audience	than	to	 local	populations.			
To	appeal	to	its	audience	of	local	Muslims	submerged	in	poor	living	conditions;	“AQIM	and	its	 offshoots	 leverage	 money,	 guns	 and	 prayers	 to	 establish	 their	 presence	 in	 poorly	governed	areas	in	the	Sahel	and	the	Sahara”	(Bøås,	2014).	The	organization	is	aware	that	a	large	percentage	of	 its	public	diplomacy	audience	are	 regionally	 situated,	 young,	Muslims	feeling	 desolated	 from	 their	 country.	 The	 majority	 of	 states	 are	 unable	 to	 provide	 their	people	with	employment	possibilities,	health	care,	and	education.	According	to	Sellassie,	the	UN	 Special	 Envoy	 of	 the	 Secretary-General	 for	 the	 Sahel,	 up	 to	 seventy	 percent	 of	populations	 in	 Burkina	 Faso,	 Chad,	 Mali,	 Mauritania	 and	 Niger	 are	 under	 the	 age	 of	 25,	consisting	of	roughly	41	million	people.	Due	to	the	lack	of	opportunities	for	the	youth,	they	are	prone	to	radicalization	and	recruitment	(UN,	2015).	In	fact,	“poverty	and	destitution	are	among	the	most	common	reasons	for	young	people	becoming	associated	with	armed	groups	in	the	Sahel”	(Chauzel,	2016:	4).	Knowing	this,	AQIM	supplies	economic	opportunities	and	social	benefits	to	 impecunious	populations	residing	in	the	region,	whilst	 incorporating	the	needs	and	concerns	of	its	adherents	into	its	brand.	
The	 AQIM	 ‘brand’	 encompasses	 several	 themes	 that	 appeal	 to	 local	 populations,	 namely	anti-Western	 sentiments	 based	 on	 historical	 colonial	 experiences,	 corruption	 of	 regional	governments,	and	the	establishment	of	an	Islamic	caliphate	in	North	Africa	(Laub	&	Masters,	2015:	3).	Droukdel	alleges	the	primary	goal	of	the	organization	is	“to	rescue	our	countries	from	the	tentacles	of	these	criminal	regimes	that	betrayed	their	religion,	and	their	people,	because	they	are	all	secretions	of	 the	colonialism	that	 invaded	our	country	 in	the	 last	 two	
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AQIM’s	 emphasis	 on	 economically	marginalized	 and	 politically	 disfranchised	Muslims.	 By	centering	 narratives	 on	 the	 abovementioned	 themes,	 AQIM	 integrates	 the	 concerns	 of	diverse	ethnic	groups	in	the	region,	including	Tuaregs,	Arabs,	black	Fulani	and	Songhai	and	tailors	its	brand	to	the	community	targeted	(IRIN	News,	2016).	
Despite	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 coherent	 polity,	 countries	 in	 the	 Sahel	 share	 a	 collective	 history	based	on	colonialism.	Thus,	a	key	constituent	of	AQIM’s	brand	is	framed	as	“fighting	a	neo-colonial	enemy	bent	on	stealing	Africa’s	riches”	(IRIN	News,	2016).	Aware	that	the	memory	of	colonization	remains	fresh	in	the	minds	of	African	publics,	AQIM	grounds	its	rhetoric	on	continued	 regional	 presence	 of	 former	 imperial	 powers	 that	 deplete	 local	 resources	 for	their	 own	 benefit.	 The	 exploitation	 of	 primary	 commodities	 by	 European	 companies	 is	 a	source	 of	 vast	 frustration	 in	 local	 communities,	 as	 little	 of	 the	 wealth	 is	 reinvested.	 The	resources	 that	 could	 provide	 people	 with	 an	 improved	 quality	 of	 life	 are	 instead	 sold	 to	external	companies	and	former	colonial	occupiers	(Kingsbury,	2015:	253).	For	instance,	the	French	state-owned	nuclear	company,	Areva,	has	mined	uranium	in	Niger	since	the	1970s.	Despite	the	profuse	uranium	extraction,	Niger	remains	one	of	the	world’s	poorest	countries	with	more	than	sixty	percent	of	 its	population	surviving	on	less	than	one	USD	per	day	(de	Clercq	 &	 Flynn,	 2014).	 Local	 populations	 condemn	 the	 presence	 of	 French	 resource-extracting	companies,	which	AQIM	utilizes	to	fuel	support.	In	response	to	the	French-led	UN	mission	 in	Mali,	Droukel	unveiled	 in	a	video	 that	 the	humanitarian	operation	 is	driven	by	self-interest.	 The	 French	 ‘invasion’	 is	 “to	 guarantee	more	 looting	 of	 the	wealth	 of	Muslim	and	African	peoples…	so	that	the	uranium	and	oil	will	keep	flowing	cheaply	and	not	for	its	true	value	to	the	industries	of	France”	(Al	Jazeera,	2014B).	AQIM’s	media	wing,	Al-Andalus,	has	 issued	 countless	 comparable	 statements	 since	 Operation	 Serval.	 By	 declaring	 that	Western	humanitarian	intervention	camouflages	true	interest	of	securing	natural	resources,	AQIM	 plays	 into	 local	 frustrations	 and	 offers	 a	 platform	 to	 rebel.	 Consequently,	 the	organization	manipulates	 the	 sensitive	 colonial	past	and	appeals	 to	 local	 exasperations	 to	increase	attractiveness.		
The	anti-imperialist	brand	includes	the	current	African	governments.	Regional	 leaders	are	framed	 as	 extensions	 of	 the	 colonial	 era,	 installed	 by	 the	Western	 powers.	 To	 illustrate,	Droukdel	avowed	“to	 liberate	the	Islamic	Maghreb	from	the	sons	of	France	and	Spain	and	from	 all	 symbols	 of	 treason	 and	 employment	 for	 the	 outsiders,	 and	 protect	 it	 from	 the	foreign	 greed	 and	 the	 crusader’s	 hegemony”	 (Wilkinson,	 2012:	 20).	 The	 terms	 ‘sons	 of	
	 35	
France	 and	 Spain’	 refer	 to	 regional	 governments	 as	 colonial	 offspring	 from	 European	powers.	As	the	large	rural,	Islamic	populations	in	Sahel	countries	view	their	governments	as	illegitimate,	 AQIM	 appeals	 to	 their	 political	 and	 economic	 marginalization.	 In	 Niger,	 for	example,	 two	 decades	 of	 rampant	 corruption	 and	 failed	 democratization	 efforts	deteriorated	trust	in	state	institutions	and	facilitated	a	sense	of	alienation	from	the	capital	(Elischer,	 2013).	 The	 narrative	 strives	 to	 delegitimize	 governmental	 regimes	 and	 allure	support	 for	 the	 organization.	 Droukel	 claims,	 “the	 Maghreb	 region	 is	 witnessing	 an	awakening	 blessed	 jihad	 in	 Mauritania,	 Morocco,	 Libya,	 Nigeria,	 after	 the	 nation	 and	 its	youths	discovered	the	size	of	employment	for	the	crusaders	and	the	treason	committed	by	this	 government	 against	 its	 people”	 (NYTimes,	 2008).	 The	 assertion	 suggests	 that	discontent	with	 corrupt	 governments	 supported	by	 imperial	 powers	 is	 expanding	AQIM’s	regional	authority.		
As	AQIM	brands	itself	as	a	jihadist	group,	fighting	for	the	rights	of	the	deprived	peoples	and	against	neocolonialism,	the	UN	missions	in	Mali	and	the	ongoing	insurgent	operation	in	the	Sahel	 are	 strategically	 manipulated	 to	 mobilize	 African	 publics.	 Operation	 Serval	 and	Operation	Barkhane	 for	 regional	 counterterrorism	may	be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 reassertion	of	colonial	 supremacy,	 in	 which	 the	 use	 of	 force	 by	Western	 powers	 drives	 foreign	 publics	towards	 AQIM.	 The	 French	 intervention	 in	 the	 Sahel	 fuels	 radicalization,	 as	 Western	presence	 intensifies	 group	 cohesion	 and	 provides	 a	 purpose	 for	 jihad	 (Smith,	 2013:	 3).	Several	 regional,	 violent	extremist	organizations	have	called	 for	attacks	 to	be	perpetrated	directly	 against	 ‘les	 Blancs’	 (Wing,	 2016:	 70).	 Thus,	 Western	 meddling	 “can	 rally	 anti-Western	 sentiment	 and	 raise	 sympathetic	 recruits	 for	 the	 extremists	 cause”	 (Detzi	 &	Winkleman,	 2015:	 232).	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	population	 in	 its	 entirety	mobilizes	 in	support	 of	militant	 groups.	 In	 contrary,	many	 civilians	 fear	 the	 rise	 of	 Islamic	 rebels	 and	very	much	welcome	intervention,	as	seen	by	Malians	waving	the	French	flag	and	celebrating	the	 arrival	 of	 troops	 in	Bamako	 (Wing,	 2016:	 60).	Nevertheless,	AQIM’s	public	 diplomacy	attempts	to	get	people	on	their	side	by	exploiting	Western	presence.		
The	 consequence	 of	 youth	 dissatisfaction	 with	 local	 governments	 is	 the	 seeking	 of	alternative	 establishments,	 such	 as	 the	 caliphate	 offered	 by	 AQIM.	 Like	 ISIS,	 the	 jihadist	organization	strives	to	conquer	land	and	establish	an	Islamic	caliphate.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	becoming	 masters	 of	 the	 region	 is	 a	 prevailing	 theme	 in	 AQIM’s	 rhetoric.	 For	 instance,	Droukdel	affirms	that	AQIM	pursues	“to	bring	back	the	place	of	Islam…	and	the	ruling	of	the	
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Quran	over	the	people”	(NYTimes,	2008).	To	advance	their	goal,	AQIM	attempts	to	chase	out	foreign	 investors	 and	 firms	 by	 targeting	 natural	 resource	 industries.	 In	 consequence,	 the	power	of	local	governments	diminishes	and	their	ties	with	foreign	allies	weaken,	facilitating	conquest	(Teirilä,	2014:	26).	To	illustrate,	on	March	18th	2016,	AQIM	attacked	an	Algerian-based	gas	plant	run	by	Western	companies,	Statoil	and	BP,	with	rocket-propelled	grenades	(Al	 Jazeera,	 2016).	 AQIM	warned	 "all	Western	 companies	 investing	 in	 shale	 gas,	 we	 will	target	 you	 in	 a	 direct	 way,	 and	 we	 will	 use	 all	 our	 capabilities	 to	 deter	 you	 from	 these	projects	 that	 are	 harmful	 to	 our	 environment	 and	 are	 rejected	 by	 our	 society"	 (Jihadist	News,	2016A).	Moreover,	 the	organization	 invokes	Islamic	values	to	appeal	 to	 its	audience	and	 offers	 an	 alternate	 government	 system.	 “Their	 use	 of	 religion	 is	 of	 particular	importance	in	an	area	where	the	local	governing	administration,	to	the	degree	that	it	exists,	is	generally	perceived	by	the	domestic	population	as	corrupt,	whereas	AQIM	and	affiliated	Islamist	 militants	 present	 themselves	 as	 honest	 and	 pious	 Muslims”	 (Bøås,	 2014).	 AQIM	additionally	 fosters	 a	 common	 identity	 on	 the	 Islamic	 faith.	 Droukel	 avows,	 “We	 are	 one	nation	with	one	religion	and	one	language.	Our	history	is	the	same	but	our	land	is	divided,	torn	apart	into	states	by	colonialism”	(NYTimes,	2008).	In	sum,	the	AQIM	brand	comprises	a	unique	blend	of	Islamic	fundamentalism	and	African	nuances.		
The	examination	of	the	brand	illustrates	how	the	organization	wants	to	be	perceived	by	its	public	 diplomacy	 recipients	 and	why	 the	 group	 is	 considered	 attractive.	 By	 analyzing	 the	core	components	of	the	brands	promoted	by	ISIS	and	AQIM,	conspicuous	dissimilarities	in	the	audience	and	image	are	exposed.	Whilst	ISIS	offers	a	sense	of	belonging	and	purpose	to	desolated	 and	 bored	 individuals	 globally,	 AQIM	 accentuates	 the	 frustrations	 of	 local	populations	 and	 tackles	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 needs	 of	 the	 impoverished.	 However,	simply	branding	the	image	is	not	sufficient	for	establishing	intersubjective	understandings.	Thus,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 inspect	 the	public	 diplomacy	 techniques	 implemented	 to	 construct	collective	identities.		
AQIM	 appears	 to	 conduct	 its	 public	 diplomacy	 and	 social	 interaction	 via	 personal	connections	and	human	contact.	On	December	16th	2015,	AQIM	 fighters	wearing	Algerian	military	 uniforms	 setup	 checkpoints	 to	 stop	 passing	 cars	 and	 converse	 with	 civilians.	According	 to	 Al-Andalus,	 the	 purpose	 was	 “to	 call	 on	 their	 Muslim	 people	 for	 their	endorsement	 and	 support,	 and	 to	 distribute	 to	 them	 media	 and	 preaching	 materials”	(Jihadist	News,	2015).	Similarly,	an	Al	jazeera	(2014A)	interview	with	Talha,	the	commander	
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of	the	AQIM	brigade	in	Timbuktu,	elucidated	personal	recruitment	efforts.	Referring	to	his	travelling	in	Niger,	Algeria,	Burkina	Faso,	and	Nigeria,	Talha	alleges,	“We	were	looking	for	a	way	 to	mobilize	 the	whole	 region	 so	 that	we	would	 not	 remain	 a	 small	 group.	We	were	looking	 for	 people	 who	 could	 form	 cells.	 There	 are	 many	 vulnerable	 people	 that	 have	nothing	 and	 you	 can	 reach	 them	 by	 spreading	 the	 word	 of	 god	 and	 helping	 them”.	 The	statements	 demonstrate	 that	 AQIM	 implements	 a	 people-to-people	 form	 of	 public	diplomacy.	 Rather	 than	 engagement	 with	 foreign	 audiences	 through	 social	 media,	 group	members	 travel	 to	 neighboring	 countries	 and	 directly	 interact	 with	 communities.	Additionally,	the	Al	Jazeera	interview	elucidates	that	AQIM	establishes	factions	throughout	the	region.	The	organization	acquaints	itself	with	militant	extremist	groups	or	salafi	jihadis	in	North	Africa	and	offers	training	and	assistance	in	exchange	for	loyalty	to	AQIM	command	(Coughlin,	2012).	Cells	are	 formed	as	alliances	of	convenience,	permitting	AQIM	to	extend	its	 foothold	 to	 a	 larger	 territory	 from	where	 it	 can	 launch	 attacks	 and	 recruit	manpower	(Boukhars,	2012:	5).		
Interviews	 conducted	 by	 Bøås	 and	 Torheim	 (2013:	 1287)	 with	 local	 populations	 in	 Mali	uncovered	methods	of	attracting	support	from	foreign	publics	and	processes	of	interaction.	Already	before	the	expansion	of	AQIM	as	an	al-Qaeda	branch,	the	organization	approached	local	 communities	 in	 the	 region	 as	 “honest	 and	 fair-minded	 traders”	 (ibid.).	 AQIM	would	purchase	 products	 at	 double	 the	 price	 and	 distributed	 goods	 to	 those	 in	 need.	 The	generosity	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 trust,	 friendly	 relations,	 and	 networks.	Additionally,	several	AQIM	adherents	married	into	local,	poor	families,	thereby	deliberately	aligning	the	group	with	the	disadvantaged	(Bøås	&	Torheim,	2013:	1287).	AQIM	employed	throngs	 of	 young	 people	 in	 its	 criminal	 activity,	 from	which	 they	 could	 earn	 their	 living	(Smith,	 2013:	 3).	 Rural	 populations	 endorsed	 AQIM	 presence,	 thereby	 constructing	favorable	intersubjective	understandings	of	one	another.		
AQIM	 also	 penetrated	 its	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 ideology	 into	 the	 communities	 by	establishing	 alliances	 with	 local	marabous	 or	 religious	 teachers	 and	 persuading	 them	 to	preach	 their	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Quran.	Marabous	 were	 endowed	 with	 gifts,	 including	money,	 cars	 and	 weapons	 to	 incentivize	 adherence	 to	 AQIM	 virtues	 of	 Islam	 (Bøås	 &	Torheim,	2013:	1287).	Intriguingly,	the	mission	creep	approach	utilized	by	AQIM	permitted	the	group	 to	promote	 its	 ideology	without	disturbing	preexisting	 cultural	 structures.	As	a	consequence,	 the	 group	 facilitated	 the	 perception	 of	 a	 common	 identity	 based	 on	 shared	
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Islamic	 values,	 marital	 linages	 and	 mutually	 beneficial	 business	 partnerships,	 allowing	AQIM	 to	 recruit	 support	 for	 its	 cause.	 The	 approach	 also	 indicates	 that	 mosques	 and	personal	connections	facilitate	radicalization	and	recruitment.		
In	other	words,	AQIM	constructed	 a	 shared	 identity	with	 local	 populations	by	 integrating	into	 the	 community.	 The	 munificence	 and	 recurrent	 collaboration	 cultivated	 a	 positive	perception	of	one	another	and	constructed	an	 intersubjective	understanding	as	allies.	The	organization	also	generated	shared	norms	and	values	revolving	around	 its	 fundamentalist	ideology	 by	 inserting	 its	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Quran	 into	 local	 preaching.	 All	 the	 factors	combined	influence	the	behavior	of	the	public	diplomacy	recipient,	thereby	enabling	foreign	support.		
As	 the	 primary	 public	 diplomacy	 recipient	 consists	 of	 the	 poor	 rural	 populations,	money	raised	by	kidnapping	and	illicit	smuggling	of	goods	is	used	to	attract	its	audience.	According	to	 Chauzel	 (2016:	 3),	 armed	 groups	 such	 as	 AQIM	 have	 established	 the	 reputation	 as	contributors	 of	 economic	 assistance,	 by	 for	 example	 distributing	medicine	 to	 community	health	centers,	educating	children	on	 the	 Islamic	 faith,	and	offering	 financial	assistance	 to	impoverished	families.	In	fact,	 local	populations	compare	AQIM	to	a	humanitarian	NGO,	as	the	organization	directly	assists	the	people	and	addresses	their	principal	needs	(Al	Jazeera,	2014A).	AQIM	also	 fulfills	 state-like	 functions,	 including	policing	 and	 reinforcement	under	Sharia	 law,	 as	 seen	 in	 its	 de	 facto	 Islamic	 government	 in	 northern	 Mali,	 which	 ruled	 an	enclave	the	size	of	Texas	prior	to	the	intervention	(Chauzel,	2016:	3).		
The	 Islamic	 task	 force	 was	mainly	 staffed	 by	members	 of	 Ansar	 Dine,	 a	 close	 affiliate	 of	AQIM,	 largely	 consisting	 of	 young,	 illiterate	 Taureg	 men	 from	 poverty-striven	 desert	families	and	offspring	of	defeated	peoples	from	previous	rebellions	(Al	Jazeera,	2014A).	The	group	attracts	ample	support,	as	“states	 in	the	Sahel	region	are	too	weak	to	compete	with	these	‘warring	statelets’,	which	have	far	greater	financial	capacity	and	powers	of	attraction,	particularly	 for	 young	people”	 (Chauzel,	 2016:	 3).	When	 asked	why	AQIM	 and	 its	 Islamic	militant	 associate	 Ansar	Dine	 are	 perceived	 attractive,	 a	 young	 interviewee	 states,	 “What	attracts	me…	is	that	they	are	assisting	the	people.	Not	only	the	impoverished	Tuareg,	but	all	poor	people	everywhere.	They	are	giving	material	gifts	of	charity	to	everyone.	And	they	are	actively	supporting	orphans”	(Al	Jazeera,	2014A).	The	actions	of	AQIM	and	its	allies	permit	the	groups	to	be	depicted	in	a	favorable	light	and	enhance	regional	soft	power.	
	 39	
As	 aforementioned,	 AQIM	 funds	 its	 public	 diplomacy	 campaign	 and	 terrorist	 activities	 by	abducting	 Westerners	 for	 ransom	 and	 trafficking	 of	 drugs,	 arms,	 money,	 humans	 and	vehicles	 through	 the	 Sahel	 to	 consumers	 in	 North	 Africa	 and	 Europe.	 For	 example,	 since	2008,	Western	states	supplied	the	terrorist	organization	with	more	than	65	million	USD	in	exchange	 for	 the	 release	 of	 hostages	 (Zhou,	 2013:	 30).	 Moreover,	 the	 UN	 estimates	 that	approximately	 sixty	 percent	 of	 cocaine	 in	 Europe	 transited	 through	West	 Africa	 (Detzi	 &	Winkleman,	 2015:	 230).	 The	 criminal	 economy	 of	 smuggling	 illicit	 goods	 and	 kidnapping	provides	AQIM	with	a	strong	financial	backbone,	which	it	uses	to	supply	 local	populations	with	economic	prospects	that	governments	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	provide.	For	instance,	AQIM	offers	 traffickers	 in	Mali	750	euros	simply	 for	useful	 intelligence,	 such	as	 informing	the	organization	on	whereabouts	of	UN	convoys.	This	is	a	significant	amount	of	money	in	a	country	 where	 the	 minimum	 monthly	 wage	 is	 only	 50	 euros	 (Chauzel,	 2015:	 2).	Interestingly,	 Malians	 have	 surpassed	 Algerians	 as	 the	 largest	 representing	 nationality	amongst	AQIM	fighters	(Guitta,	2016).	The	economic	and	financial	incentives	offered	by	the	jihadist	organization	in	Mali	have	likely	increased	its	attractiveness,	thereby	accounting	for	the	large	number	of	Malian	recruits.		
In	sum,	 to	promote	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	values	and	 its	cause,	AQIM	 interacts	with	 local	populations	 and	 addresses	 their	 fundamental	 needs.	 “The	 worsening	 of	 socio-economic	conditions	 in	 the	 region	 has	 stimulated	 the	 development	 and	 spread	 of	 terrorist	recruitment	 networks	 in	 these	 and	 neighboring	 countries”	 (Bartolucci,	 2015:	 107).	 By	supplying	 economic	 opportunities	 and	 social	welfare,	AQIM	 is	 accepted	 and	 embraced	by	local	 societies.	 Additionally,	 its	 aid	 enhances	 soft	 power,	 because	 it	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	humanitarian	organization.	The	 frequent	 contact	with	 local	populations	and	promotion	of	Islamic	ideology	generates	a	common	identity	and	support	for	the	jihadist	organization.		
Although	AQIM	emphasizes	regional	publics,	the	organization	also	strives	to	win	the	hearts	and	minds	of	 international	 audiences	 through	 ties	with	Diasporas	and	 the	 Internet.	AQIM	members	browse	jihadist	forums	online	to	identify	potential	sympathizers	and	invite	them	to	 encrypted	 pages	where	 interaction	 occurs	 (Filiu,	 2013:	 95).	 Like	 ISIS,	 the	 organization	profited	significantly	from	its	association	with	al-Qaeda.	Not	only	did	the	organization	lack	the	 resources	 and	 knowledge	 to	 exploit	 cyber	 technology	 and	 disseminate	 messages	 to	inform	 foreign	 publics	 of	 its	 accomplishments	 and	 goals,	 other	 international	 terrorist	groups	 often	 disregarded	 GSPC	 as	 jihad	 (Torres-Soriano,	 2010:	 85).	 Accordingly,	 AQIM	
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substantively	 benefited	 from	 immediate	 access	 to	 the	 larger	 al-Qaeda	 audience	 and	 the	skillsets	of	the	parent	organization	and	other	branches	in	the	network	(Byman,	2014:	442-3).	To	 illustrate,	 prior	 to	 affiliation,	 the	 editing	 software	utilized	 consisted	of	 a	 free	demo	program,	which	only	permitted	 a	maximum	 length	of	 three	minutes	per	 video.	Moreover,	the	watermark	of	the	software	company	was	stamped	on	each	production	(Torres-Soriano,	2010:	77).	The	group	also	experienced	great	difficulty	maintaining	an	operational	website.	Almost	 immediately	 after	 merging	 with	 al-Qaeda,	 the	 quantity	 and	 quality	 of	 its	 media	production	 increased	 tremendously.	 Solely	 in	 2007,	 the	 organization	 released	 six	 well-edited	videos,	which	is	double	the	amount	launched	in	the	previous	eight	years	(Ibid:	82).		
Despite	 significant	 improvement	 since	 joining	 al-Qaeda,	 AQIM	has	 not	 been	 as	 capable	 at	using	 the	 Internet	 to	 mobilize	 foreign	 support.	 AQIM	 launched	 its	 first	 online	 public	diplomacy	attempt	in	March	2013,	by	creating	a	formal	Facebook	page,	Twitter	account	and	blog.	However,	its	Facebook	page	was	shutdown	relatively	quickly	and	its	blog	was	seldom	updated,	 resulting	 in	 Twitter	 being	 the	 central	 digital	 public	 diplomacy	 tool	 to	 publicize	information	(Torres-Soriano,	2016:	9).	Twitter	was	used	to	hold	“open	meetings”,	in	which	foreign	 publics	 and	 journalists	 could	 submit	 questions	 to	 the	 head	 of	 media	 (Weimann,	2014:	 9).	 Although	 the	 use	 of	 social	 media	 permitted	 AQIM	 to	 reach	 a	 wider	 audience–	15,000	 followers	 on	 its	 official	 Al-Andalus	 Twitter	 page	 and	 approximately	 3,350	 on	 its	Muslim	Africa	account	–the	group	did	not	maintain	a	steady	presence	online.	The	accounts	were	suspended	the	first	time	in	December	2013,	and	the	organization	failed	to	open	a	new	account	until	May	2014,	which	was	again	suspended	in	November.	No	new	attempts	were	made	until	July	2015	(Torres-Soriano,	2016:	11).		
The	 group	 also	 failed	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 full	 public	 diplomacy	 potential	 of	 Twitter.	AQIM	publishes	 images	 and	 links	 to	 videos	 and	 texts	 as	 opposed	 to	 engaging	 in	 two-way	dialogue	with	its	followers.	For	example,	rather	than	converse	with	interested	participants	in	open	meetings,	AQIM	collected	the	questions	and	released	a	PDF-document	the	following	week	 containing	 written	 answers	 (Weimann,	 2014:	 9)	 Consequently,	 the	 Twitter	 pages	informed	 interested	 audiences	 and	 promoted	 fundamentalist	 values,	 but	 the	 capability	 to	extensively	 converse	with	 foreign	audiences	was	 largely	neglected.	 In	 comparison	 to	 ISIS,	the	group	has	not	significantly	enhanced	the	quality	of	its	public	diplomacy	through	the	use	of	social	media	nor	did	it	necessarily	facilitate	the	construction	of	common	identities	online.	
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Currently,	AQIM	uses	Telegram	to	distribute	information	and	interact	with	foreign	publics,	especially	since	the	app	less	frequently	suspends	accounts	and	offers	a	platform	for	private	interaction.	The	Al-Andalus	Telegram	channel	posts	official	statements,	videos,	photos	and	links	to	active	Twitter	accounts.		For	instance,	the	channel	uploaded	the	official	claiming	of	responsibility	 for	 the	 rocket	 attack	 on	 the	 BP	 gas	 plant	 (Jihadist	 News,	 2016B).	 Although	AQIM	has	the	potential	to	connect	with	far	audiences,	the	page	content,	statements,	 image	captions	and	videos	are	almost	entirely	in	Arabic.	Contrarily,	ISIS	publications	are	primarily	in	English	with	subtitles	readily	available	for	any	Arabic	content.	Accordingly,	AQIM’s	public	diplomacy	 likely	 targets	 a	 local	 audience	 or	 Diasporas	 abroad,	 while	 ISIS	 aims	 to	 attract	sympathizers	globally.		
To	conclude,	the	public	diplomacy	campaign	exerted	by	AQIM	is	largely	conducted	by	real-life	interaction	rather	than	communication	through	online	platforms.	As	its	prime	source	of	foreign	 support–	 disadvantaged,	 illiterate	 men	 living	 in	 the	 Sahel	 –unlikely	 has	 regular	access	 to	 Internet,	 the	meager	use	 of	 social	media	most	 probably	 addresses	 international	Diasporas.	 Since	 virtual	 platforms	 are	 scarcely	 applied,	 the	 recruitment	 of	 distant	 publics	appears	 to	 be	 less	 important	 to	 AQIM.	 The	 following	 section	 analyzes	 the	 role	 public	diplomacy	played	in	the	AQIM	attacks	in	Burkina	Faso	and	Ivory	Coast.		
7.2	Public	Diplomacy	in	the	2016	Ouagadougou	and	Grand	Bassam	Attacks			
In	January	at	the	Cappuccino	Café	in	Burkina	Faso,	AQIM	gunmen	opened	fire	on	civilians,	explicitly	 targeting	 ‘white’	 foreigners	and	killing	Burkinabe	citizens	 in	 the	process.	Almost	immediately	after,	an	explosive	device	detonated	in	the	parking	lot	of	the	nearby	Splendid	Hotel,	 followed	 by	 armed	militants	 storming	 into	 the	 lobby	 and	 restaurant,	where	 guests	were	sieged	for	nearly	fifteen	hours	(Lebovitch,	2016).	The	attacks	killed	thirty	people	from	eighteen	 different	 countries	 (West,	 2016).	 Similarly,	 in	March,	militia	 wearing	 balaclavas	and	armed	with	Kalashnikovs	went	on	a	shooting	rampage	at	Grand	Bassam	in	Ivory	Coast.	Starting	at	a	beach	resort,	 the	terrorists	 fired	on	unarmed	civilians,	wounding	dozens	and	killing	nineteen	(Bavier,	2016).	Both	targeted	locations	were	popular	destinations	for	local	elites	and	foreign	expats,	businessmen,	NGO	and	UN	employees.	Just	a	few	months	earlier,	AQIM	 launched	 a	 comparable	 attack	 on	 the	 Radisson	Blu	Hotel	 in	 Bamako,	whose	 guests	were	mainly	UN	workers	deployed	 in	Mali.	The	occurrences	symbolize	an	expansion	 from	the	Sahel	 into	West	Africa,	 indicating	growth	in	AQIM’s	transnational	reach	(Lister,	2016).	
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By	 inspecting	 the	content,	 the	perpetrators	and	 the	aftermath	of	 the	assaults,	 insights	are	gained	into	how	public	diplomacy	of	non-state	actors	facilitates	terrorism	and	vice	versa.		
In	 the	 midst	 of	 the	 attack	 on	 the	 Splendid	 Hotel,	 AQIM	 congratulated	 its	 fighters	 by	circulating	an	announcement	in	Arabic	on	Telegram,	reading,	“Your	mujahedeen	brothers…	broke	into	a	restaurant	of	one	of	the	biggest	hotels	 in	the	capital	of	Burkina	Faso,	and	are	now	entrenched	and	the	clashes	are	continuing	with	the	enemies	of	 the	religion”	(Jihadist	News,	2016C).	Al-Andalus	also	phoned	with	 the	perpetrators	during	 the	 siege	and	 taped	a	three-minute	audio	clip,	called	‘A	Message	Signed	with	Blood	and	Body	Parts’.	According	to	the	fighters,	their	reasons	for	the	attack	are	to	mobilize	youth	of	the	ummah	towards	jihad	and	to	take	revenge	against	French	and	Western	kuffar	(Ibid.).	AQIM’s	heat	of	the	moment	publications	denote	the	intention	of	exploiting	the	momentum	surrounding	the	terrorist	act	to	maximize	publicity	and	direct	attention	 towards	 the	organization.	Moreover,	 the	attack	itself	 was	 likely	 driven	 by	 the	 interest	 of	 obtaining	 favorable	 public	 opinion	 within	 its	targeted	audience.	
	The	 official	 AL-Andalus	 statement	 was	 published	 two	 days	 after	 the	 Burkina	 Faso	confrontation,	announcing	the	deceased	‘heroes’	responsible	for	violently	seizing	the	hotel	and	claiming	responsibility	for	the	terror.	The	statement	alleges,	“The	assignment	was	given	to	 the	 praiseworthy	 brothers–	 may	 Allah	 accept	 them	 in	 al-Firdaws	 –al-Battar	 al-Ansari,	Abu	Muhammad	 al-Buqli,	 Ahmad	 al-Fulani	 al-Ansari,	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 noble	 task”	 (AQIM,	2016A).	 Photographs	 of	 the	 perpetrators	 accompany	 the	 statement,	 which	 can	 be	 found	below.	Unlike	 the	 ISIS	 attackers	 in	Paris	 and	Brussels,	 relatively	 little	 is	 known	about	 the	abovementioned	men.	Witness	statements	acknowledge	the	young	age	of	the	perpetrators,	which	is	corroborated	by	the	images	(West,	2016).	Based	on	their	appearance	and	names,	the	perpetrators	fit	the	profile	of	the	adolescent,	impoverished	public	diplomacy	recipient.	The	men	are	suspected	to	be	from	Mali,	as	hinted	by	the	‘al-Ansari’	label	in	their	name	and	the	 referral	 of	 the	 perpetrators	 as	 “knights	 of	 Azawad”	 in	 the	 Al-Andalus	 statement.	Additionally,	 the	 ‘al-Fulani’	heading	 identifies	one	of	 the	perpetrators	originating	from	the	Fulani	 ethnicity,	 a	 group	 of	 roughly	 thirty	million	 strong	 dispersed	 across	 the	 Sahel	 and	West	Africa	(Lebovitch,	2016).	As	all	 fighters	are	postulated	to	be	of	Sahel-Saharan	origin,	the	 claim	 that	 AQIM’s	 public	 diplomacy	 largely	 focuses	 on	 local	 populations	 and	 recruits	support	 regionally	 is	 validated.	 The	 presence	 of	 a	 Fulani	 fighter	 additionally	 affirms	 the	ability	of	AQIM	to	mobilize	support	by	exploiting	local	grievances.	“Fulani	populations	have	
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increasingly	 sought	 to	 protect	 themselves	 in	 conflicts	with	 rival	 communities	 over	water	access	and	grazing	rights,	while	 they	have	also	suffered	discrimination	 in	some	areas	and	repression,	 particularly	 in	 the	 Central	 African	 Republic	 and	 Mali”	 (Ibid.).	 The	 official	 Al-
Andalus	statement	of	responsibility	asserted	that	the	attack	is	part	of	a	series	of	operations	motivated	to	purify	the	 land	of	 Islam	from	Western	states	and	to	avenge	their	brothers	 in	the	Central	Africa	Republic	and	Mali	(AQIM,	2016A).	Since	the	announcement	explicitly	cited	the	aforementioned	countries,	it	is	likely	local	perceptions	of	injustice	and	the	exploitation	of	valuable	resources	played	a	role	in	their	recruitment.			
Similarly,	 shortly	 after	 jihadists	 opened	 fire	 on	 tourists	 at	 Grand	 Bassam;	 AQIM	 posted	 a	formal	 statement	 on	 Telegram	 declaring	 responsibility.	 Al-Andalus	 stated,	 “three	 heroes	from	the	knights	of	Qaedat	al-Jihad	 in	 the	 Islamic	Maghreb	were	able	 to	storm	the	 tourist	resort	 “Grand	Bassam,”	situated	east	of	 the	city	of	Abidjan,	 in	 Ivory	Coast”	 (Jihadist	News,	2016E).	 In	 the	 days	 following,	 AQIM	 published	 the	 names	 and	 photos	 of	 the	 suicide	attackers.	 The	 perpetrators	 were	 identified	 as	 Hamza	 al-Fulani,	 Abu	 Adam	 al-Ansari	 and	Abdul	Rahman	al-Fulani	 (Jihadist	News,	2016F).	Like	 the	extremists	at	 the	Splendid	Hotel,	the	men	behind	the	attack	are	strikingly	young	and	appear	to	be	locally	recruited,	based	on	the	‘al-Fulani’	and	‘al-Ansari’	nom-de-guerre.	Although	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	prove	with	certainty,	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 campaign	 exerted	 by	 AQIM	 seems	 to	 seduce	 regional	populations,	 especially	 considering	 the	 perpetrators	 origin	 from	 a	 diverse	 network	 of	fighters.	AQIM’s	leader	of	the	Sahel	Brigade,	Yahya	Abu	el-Hammam,	referring	to	recruiting	new	 African	 networks	 proclaimed,	 "Today,	 the	 mujahedeen	 have	 built	 up	 brigades	 and	battalions	 with	 sons	 of	 the	 region,	 our	 black	 brothers,	 Peuls	 (Fulani),	 Bambaras	 and	Songhai"	 (Ettaba,	 2016).	 The	 statement	 indicates	 that	 AQIM	 seemingly	 constructed	 an	
Figure	7.	Source:	Jihadist	News	(2016D).			
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intersubjective	 understanding	 as	 allies	 with	 varying	 ethnicities	 in	 the	 region.	 The	interacting	 with	 local	 publics,	 integrating	 into	 Sahel	 communities,	 forming	 business	partnerships	and	preaching	Islamic	values	likely	establish	shared	identities.	Moreover,	the	expanding	network	insinuates	AQIM	soft	power,	because	new	groups	want	to	join	the	cause.			
As	AQIM	published	 the	 attacks	 online	 to	 enhance	 the	 organization’s	 visibility,	 the	 actions	involve	an	imperative	public	diplomacy	function:	getting	the	attention	of	the	audience	and	sympathizers.	The	execution	of	coordinated	strikes	against	Westerners	likely	raises	AQIM’s	attractiveness	within	the	frustrated	youth,	as	well	as	other	regional	Islamic	fundamentalist	organizations	 with	 comparable	 goals.	 Particularly	 the	 recruitment	 of	 the	 latter	 delivers	substantial	 benefits.	 For	 instance,	 AQIM’s	 al-Mourabitoun	 battalion,	 commanded	 by	 one-eyed	Mokhtar	Belmokhtar,	perpetrated	the	assaults	in	Burkina	Faso	(Jihadist	News,	2016C).	Additionally,	 two	 out	 of	 three	 named	 Grand	 Bassam	 terrorists	 were	 al-Mourabitoun	adherents;	 the	 third	 belonged	 to	 AQIM’s	 Saharan	 Emirate	 branch	 (Jihadist	 News,	 2016E).	Expanding	 AQIM	 membership	 to	 include	 al-Mourabitoun	 supplies	 the	 organization	 with	manpower	 and	 permits	 AQIM	 to	 tap	 into	 al-Mourabitoun’s	 support	 base.	 Moreover,	 the	formation	of	 factions	with	other	militant	groups	enables	AQIM	to	 intensify	 its	presence	 in	the	Maghreb,	whilst	simultaneously	extending	influence	into	West	Africa.		
The	organization	strategically	benefits	from	allegiance	of	cells,	because	recognition	for	the	attacks	 is	 granted	 to	 AQIM,	 despite	 the	 actions	 being	 executed	 by	 another	 group.	 To	illustrate,	 the	 unification	 between	 AQIM	 and	 al-Mourabitoun	 occurred	 only	 one	 month	before	the	terrorist	acts	in	Ouagadougou.	Prior	to	the	merge,	al-Mourabitoun	prepared	and	perpetrated	 the	assault	on	 the	Radisson	Blu	Hotel	 in	Bamako,	 in	conjunction	with	AQIM’s	Saharan	 unit.	 Despite	 al-Mourabitoun’s	 role	 as	 mastermind,	 the	 attack	 is	 predominantly	
Figure	8.	Source:	Jihadist	News	(2016F).			
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accredited	 to	AQIM	(Ibid.).	Thus,	 expanding	 the	alliance	network	grants	AQIM	access	 to	a	larger	 audience,	 followers,	 and	 publicity	 for	 attacks	 without	 significantly	 burdening	 the	organization’s	financial	and	human	resources.		
The	 rhetoric	 surrounding	 the	 acts	 of	 terrorism	 confirms	 the	 alleged	 components	 of	 the	brand.	 Both	 the	 official	 Al-Andalus	 statements	 indicate	 the	 enemy	 targeted	 as	 crusaders	“occupying	our	lands	and	looting	our	fortunes”	(Jihadist	News,	2016F).	Likewise,	the	actions	of	the	perpetrators	harm	both	near	and	far	enemies,	as	foreign	civilians	are	targeted	within	AQIM-controlled	 territory.	 The	 two-birds-with-one-stone	 strategy	 beleaguer	 international	adversaries	 by	 attacking	what	 AQIM	 calls	 “dens	 of	 global	 espionage”,	whilst	 concurrently	frightening	local	populations	and	harming	the	economy	(Jihadist	News,	2016B).	Ambushing	luxurious	 hotels	 damages	 the	 North	 African	 tourism	 industry,	 as	 seen	 by	 a	 decline	 of	vacationers	 in	 Tunisia	 after	 the	 Sousse	 beach	 massacre	 (Stephen,	 2015).	 Grand	 hotels	receive	fewer	guests,	in	addition	to	escalating	costs	to	spike	up	security.	The	publicity	of	the	terrorist	 attacks	 deters	 tourists	 and	potential	 investors	 from	 the	 region,	 reducing	 foreign	income	 for	 local	 governments	 and	 rising	 unemployment	 (Eizenga	 &	 Villalón,	 2016).	 The	rhetoric	 and	 actions	 surrounding	 the	 recent	 attacks	 validate	 assumptions	 that	 AQIM	explicitly	attributes	 its	 terror	 to	Western	governments	and	 their	 local	accomplices,	whom	rob	 the	 region	 of	 its	 resources	 and	 wealth.	 The	 brand	 promoted	 draws	 frustrated	populations	 to	 the	 organization.	 Similarly,	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 themselves	 become	incorporated	into	the	public	diplomacy	campaign,	as	they	realize	the	goals	AQIM	promotes,	thus	forming	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy.		
The	 presence	 of	 ISIS	 influence	 in	 Libya	 may	 pressure	 AQIM	 to	 execute	 regular	 terrorist	attacks,	in	fear	of	would	be-recruits	joining	the	opponent.	Because	successful	attacks	inspire	recruits,	 AQIM	 ambushes	 international	 targets	 and	 strategically	 selects	 locations	 that	guarantee	global	media	coverage,	as	evidenced	by	striking	tourist	hotspots	(Onuoha,	2016:	6).	In	four	months	time,	AQIM	has	launched	three	violent	onslaughts	against	France	and	its	African	 partners,	 recuperating	 the	 organization’s	 credibility	 in	 the	 jihadist	 world.	 The	attacks	signify	that	AQIM	remains	the	dominant	terrorist	group	in	the	region	and	is	capable	of	 extending	 its	 influence	 to	 new	 frontiers.	 The	 need	 to	 bolster	 its	 reputation	 is	 most	probably	 linked	 to	 publications	 depicting	 AQIM	 as	 a	 declining	 power	 as	 consequence	 of	Operation	Serval.	Additionally,	AQIM	lost	potential	recruits	and	adherents	to	ISIS,	including	AQIM	partner	Boko	Haram,	which	recently	pledged	loyalty	to	al-Baghdadi	(Nickels,	2016).	
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The	 recent	 shootings	 aim	 to	 deter	 AQIM	 renegades	 by	 demonstrating	 the	 organization	 is	“still	 alive	and	kicking”	and	capable	of	 carrying	out	 coordinated	 strikes	 (Guitta,	2016).	As	such,	the	attacks	serve	an	imperative	public	diplomacy	function	of	dissuading	the	support	of	rivaling	organizations	and	demonstrating	that	jihad	against	the	international	enemy	can	be	fought	close	to	home.		
AQIM	 also	 upped	 its	 game	 by	 advancing	 its	 online	 public	 diplomacy	 through	 mimicking	techniques	distinctively	used	by	ISIS.	For	instance,	Al-Andalus	launched	the	video	‘The	Issue	of	 Our	 Captives’	 casting	 a	 masked,	 British-accented	 man	 with	 a	 striking	 resemblance	 to	ISIS’s	 ‘Jihadi	 John’,	 in	 addition	 to	 playing	nasheeds	 in	 the	 background	 (AQIM,	 2016B).	 The	video	denotes	an	ideological	rivalry	for	power,	particularly	regarding	Muslims	in	the	Sahel.	After	the	AQIM	assaults	on	hotels	in	Bamako	and	Ouagadougou,	ISIS	aired	a	video	campaign	directed	 at	 the	 Islamic	 Maghreb	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 persuading	 Muslims	 in	 North	 Africa	 to	connect	with	the	international	group	(Cristiani	&	Zenn,	2016:	7).	Furthermore,	for	the	first	time,	 the	 Al-Andalus	 statement	 after	 the	 Grand	 Bassam	 terror	 was	 published	 in	 four	different	 languages,	 rather	 than	 merely	 in	 Arabic.	 Hence,	 AQIM	 is	 likely	 intensifying	 its	online	presence	to	compete	with	the	public	diplomacy	of	ISIS	and	maintain	authority	within	its	neighborhood.	
Unlike	 Paris	 and	 Brussels,	 little	 to	 no	 international	 online	 appraisal	 appears	 to	 have	followed	 the	 attacks.	 Although	 tweets	 and	 other	messages	may	 have	 been	 deleted,	 news	channels	did	not	report	celebrations	after	 the	Ouagadougou	and	Grand	Bassam	shootings,	which	 was	 the	 case	 following	 the	 hotel	 siege	 in	 Bamako	 (Bulos	 &	 Callimachi,	 2015).	Nonetheless,	al-Shabaab,	an	al-Qaeda	affiliate	in	Somalia,	congratulated	AQIM	for	the	assault	on	 the	 Splendid	 Hotel	 and	 Cappuccino	 Café	 by	 affirming,	 “striking	 the	 interests	 of	 the	Crusaders	is	the	greatest	revenge	for	our	oppressed	Muslims	brothers	in	Jerusalem	and	in	the	Land	of	the	Two	Holy	Mosques	[Saudi	Arabia],	and	elsewhere”	(Jihadist	News,	2016G).		
To	conclude,	regional	affiliate	organizations	use	public	diplomacy	immensely	different	from	international	groups.	AQIM’s	public	diplomacy	campaign	contains	a	narrow	focus	based	on	the	 needs	 of	 local	 populations	 and	 promotes	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 values	 through	personal	connections.	Consequently,	AQIM	 is	characterized	a	 ‘glocal’	organization,	 “deeply	embedded	 in	 local	 networks	 while	 also	 operating	 rhetorically	 and	 physically	 against	international	targets	and	engaging	with	issues	of	international	interest”	(Lebovitch,	2016).	
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The	succeeding	section	discusses	the	key	findings	and	variations	in	the	public	diplomacy	of	both	non-state	actors.	
8 . 	 D i s c u s s i o n 	 a n d 	 F i n d i n g s 	The	 analysis	 of	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 exerted	 by	 ISIS	 and	AQIM	 and	 its	 role	 in	 the	 recent	terrorist	attacks	reveals	immense	dissimilarities	between	the	two	jihadist	groups.	The	first,	most	noticeable	difference	is	the	audience	targeted.	The	public	diplomacy	promoted	by	ISIS	aims	 to	 radicalize	 the	average	 Joe	and	plain	 Jane	 in	 foreign	 societies	as	well	 as	moderate,	young	 Muslims	 that	 feel	 marginalized	 from	 their	 society	 of	 origin	 and	 are	 searching	 for	adventure	 or	 a	 place	 of	 belonging.	 In	 contrast,	 AQIM	 reaches	 out	 to	 regionally	 dispersed,	rural	 communities	 and	 young,	 illiterate	 men.	 Thus,	 both	 the	 targeted	 audiences	 feel	alienated	from	their	state,	but	for	varying	reasons.	Additionally,	the	jihadist	groups	appear	to	focus	on	the	impressionable	youth.	A	core	disparity	in	the	public	diplomacy	strategies	is	that	ISIS	targets	its	audience	globally,	whilst	AQIM	focuses	on	frustrated,	local	groups.		
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 brand	 promoted	 corresponds	 with	 the	 intended	 public	 diplomacy	audience.	ISIS	portrays	itself	to	be	an	inclusive	brotherhood	fighting	for	the	righteous	cause	of	 establishing	 and	defending	 the	 Islamic	 caliphate.	 The	 brand	provides	 disillusioned	 and	disenchanted	youth	with	a	sense	of	purpose	and	a	common	identity	based	on	its	extremist	ideology.	Comparatively,	AQIM’s	narrative	depicts	 itself	as	a	Robin	Hood-like	organization	standing	 up	 for	 the	 disadvantaged	 population	 by	 combating	 the	 wealthy	 enemy	 and	 its	regional	 accomplices,	 whom	 are	 profiting	 from	 resources	 stolen	 from	 the	 impoverished.	AQIM	promotes	a	brand	 centered	on	 regional	nuisances	with	an	 Islamic	 ideological	 twist.	The	 variances	 in	 the	 branding	 of	 the	 jihadist	 groups	 insinuates	 that	 both	 organizations	adapt	their	public	diplomacy	strategies	to	the	needs	of	the	message	recipients	and	actively	devote	 resources	 to	 expand	 the	 sphere	 of	 influence	 by	 winning	 the	 hearts	 and	minds	 of	foreign	populations.			
The	 first	 hypothesis	 postulated	 that	 the	 investment	 of	 time	 and	 resources	 to	 promote	Islamic	 fundamentalist	 values	 and	 a	 brand	 that	 appeals	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 audience	enhances	 the	 mobilization	 capabilities	 of	 the	 terrorist	 organization.	 The	 findings	 of	 the	analysis	support	the	hypothesis.	Both	jihadist	groups	invest	considerably	in	branding	their	Islamic	 fundamentalist	 values	 to	 the	 message	 recipients,	 as	 seen	 by	 AQIM	 preaching	 its	cause	and	values	to	 local	communities	and	ISIS	via	a	sophisticated	online	presence.	 It	was	
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also	 anticipated	 that	 because	 ISIS	 has	 more	 resources	 at	 its	 disposal,	 it	 would	 be	 more	capable	than	AQIM	at	mobilizing	external	audiences	through	capturing	their	interests.	ISIS’s	globalized	approach	supplies	the	group	with	greater	access	to	human	capital	encompassing	advanced	 skills.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Western	 foreign	 fighters	 bring	 modern	 technological	know-how	 and	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 languages,	 enabling	 ISIS	 to	 develop	 its	 superior	 media	campaign.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 and	 brand	 of	 ISIS	 indeed	 appears	 to	boost	popularity	amongst	foreign	populations,	thereby	validating	the	premise.	Moreover,	it	was	 speculated	 that	 regional	 affiliates	would	prioritize	 the	public	 diplomacy	 recipients	 in	their	direct	neighborhood.	As	AQIM	tailors	its	brand	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	North	African	people,	the	assumption	is	supported.		
ISIS	 and	 AQIM	 also	 utilize	 similar	 public	 diplomacy	 strategies	 to	 reach	 and	 facilitate	interaction	with	 the	message	 recipients.	However,	 the	 strategies	 are	 employed	 in	 varying	ways.	For	example,	both	 jihadist	groups	 interact	with	potential	 recruits	and	sympathizers	directly.	Several	ISIS	fighters	appear	to	have	been	recruited	from	terrorist	hotbeds	and	had	ISIS	 adherents	 as	 contacts	 in	 their	 networks,	 revealed	 by	 the	 linkages	 between	 the	perpetrators	 in	 the	Paris	and	Brussels	attacks.	Conversely,	AQIM	enthusiasts	 travel	across	the	region	to	dispersed,	foreign	societies,	where	they	converse	and	integrate	into	the	local	community	 through	 marriage,	 business	 relations,	 and	 friendship.	 Thus,	 both	 groups	promote	 their	 values	 and	 cause	 through	 direct	 human	 contact,	 but	 the	 methods	 of	interaction	and	recruitment	diverge.		
The	 terrorist	 attacks	 themselves	 are	 also	 employed	 by	 jihadist	 groups	 to	 increase	attractiveness	within	targeted	populations.	Both	online	platforms	and	traditional	media	are	used	to	inform	foreign	publics	of	the	attacks.	Nonetheless,	the	videos	issued	by	ISIS	after	the	attacks,	 glorifying	 the	 perpetrators	 were	 significantly	 more	 advanced	 than	 the	 images	circulated	by	AQIM.	Furthermore,	to	legitimize	their	cause	and	mobilize	support,	both	ISIS	and	 AQIM	 strategically	 take	 advantage	 of	 a	 national	 conflict,	 namely	 Syria	 and	 Mali.	However,	 the	 crisis	 in	 Mali	 is	 overshadowed	 by	 the	 humanitarian	 catastrophe	 in	 Syria,	especially	 because	 the	 latter	 receives	widespread	media	 coverage.	 The	mass	migration	of	Syrian	refugees,	the	establishment	of	an	Islamic	caliphate,	and	the	persistence	of	the	Assad	regime	 are	 all	 highly	 publicized	 issues,	 assisting	 ISIS	 in	 projecting	 its	 name	 to	 a	 broad	audience.	Additionally,	the	Paris	and	Brussels	attacks	receive	more	media	attention	than	the	AQIM	shootings	in	Burkina	Faso	and	Ivory	Coast,	based	on	the	lack	of	information	available	
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on	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 the	 latter	 incidents.	 Consequently,	 the	 superior	 publicity	 of	 ISIS’s	existence	 permits	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 potentially	 inspire	 a	 wider	 international	audience.		
The	 second	 hypothesis	 reasoned	 that	 engagement	 with	 the	 intended	 audience	 fosters	favorable	public	opinion,	protests	and	support,	because	the	public	diplomacy	actor	shapes	the	beliefs	 and	behavior	of	 the	 recipients	 in	 accordance	 to	 its	own	 interests.	The	analysis	revealed	 that	widespread,	 international	appraisal	 followed	 the	Brussels	and	Paris	attacks,	as	sympathizers	globally	posted	celebratory	tweets.	Also,	Muslims	protested	the	airstrikes	against	 the	 jihadist	 group	 from	 Jakarta	 to	 London	 to	 Sydney.	 The	 research	 did	 not	 come	across	such	support	for	AQIM	following	the	shootings	in	Burkina	Faso	and	Ivory	Coast.	Yet,	the	lack	of	visible	support	does	not	necessarily	signify	that	AQIM	is	incapable	of	influencing	the	thoughts	and	behavior	of	its	audience.	It	may	very	well	be	the	case	that	its	sympathizers	are	 less	 open	 to	 displaying	 their	 association	 with	 the	 group	 or	 have	 limited	 access	 to	computers.	A	possible	sign	of	 increased	support	 is	the	perpetration	of	attacks	by	cells	and	the	 merge	 with	 al-Mourabitoun.	 As	 such,	 the	 analysis	 of	 ISIS’s	 public	 diplomacy	corroborates	the	hypothesis;	while	for	AQIM,	this	was	not	the	case.			
Another	 fundamental	 contrast	 is	 the	 use	 of	 technology	 and	 online	 platforms	 to	 mobilize	foreign	support,	particularly	social	media	as	it	permits	initial	contact	and	interaction	to	take	place.	 In	 comparison	 to	 other	 terrorist	 organizations,	 ISIS	 entails	 a	 sophisticated	 and	technologically	 modern	 public	 diplomacy	 campaign,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 its	 high-quality	productions	in	several	languages	and	its	comprehensive	networks.	AQIM,	on	the	other	hand,	was	 the	 last	 jihadist	 group	 to	 “realize	 the	 strategic	 need	 for	 extensive	 communicative	actions”	 (Torres-Soriano,	2016:	4).	Additionally,	 the	group	 failed	 to	 take	advantage	of	 the	communication	 opportunities	 provided	 by	 social	 media.	 The	 study	 reveals	 that	 terrorist	organizations	 can	 benefit	 considerably	 from	 directly	 connecting	 with	 diverse	 audiences,	particularly	 because	 those	 audiences	 can	 become	 active	 public	 diplomacy	 participants	themselves,	as	seen	by	ISIS	outsourcing	its	information	dissemination.	The	development	of	a	 virtual	 community	 permits	 public	 diplomacy	 respondents	 to	 support	 the	 organization	without	having	to	physically	be	present.	Comparatively,	traditional	media	sources	including	radio	 and	 television	 are	 not	 interactive	 and	 thus	 less	 capable	 at	 establishing	 such	communities.	
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The	 third	 hypothesis,	 based	 on	 constructivist	 assumptions,	 postulated	 that	 public	diplomacy	strategies	facilitating	two-way	dialogue	are	more	proficient	at	promoting	Islamic	fundamentalist	values	and	mobilizing	foreign	support.	Both	the	public	diplomacy	strategies	sufficiently	allow	the	groups	to	communicate	with	their	intended	audiences.	ISIS	and	AQIM	use	 personal	 networks	 to	 converse,	 vesting	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 collective	 identity	 and	goals.	Nonetheless,	the	social	media	use	of	ISIS	is	clearly	superior	to	that	of	AQIM,	resulting	in	 radicalized	 youth	 travelling	 from	 all	 over	 the	world	 to	 align	with	 the	 group,	 including	prospective	AQIM	recruits.	 Interestingly,	 the	 thesis	assumed	social	media	 to	be	a	primary	reason	why	jihadist	organizations	are	capable	of	conducting	public	diplomacy,	particularly	because	of	the	lack	of	prior	research	on	the	topic.	The	direct	interaction	tactic	discloses	that	terrorist	 organizations	 strategically	 utilized	 public	 diplomacy	 long	 before	 the	 Internet.	Nevertheless,	despite	both	of	the	public	diplomacy	strategies	capable	of	enabling	dialogue,	ISIS	appears	to	attract	a	larger	pool	of	supporters,	thereby	confirming	the	postulation	that	well-developed	use	of	social	media	potentially	draws	more	support.			
The	 act	 of	 communicating	 is	 essential	 to	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 of	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	organizations,	 because	 it	 permits	 the	 group	 to	 legitimize	 itself,	 while	 simultaneously	delegitimizing	others.	By	 framing	 the	 cause	 and	values	 contradictory	 to	 those	of	Western	governments,	civilians	and	allies,	both	ISIS	and	AQIM	attempt	to	influence	the	respondent’s	identity.	 Through	 interaction,	 the	 jihadist	 groups	 replace	 existing	 socially	 constructed	realities	 of	 the	message	 recipient	with	 a	 new	 identity	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	 values	 and	interests	 of	 the	 terrorist	 organizations.	Hypothesis	 four	 assumed	 that	 soft	 power	 and	 the	perception	 of	 a	 common	 identity	 motivates	 foreign	 support,	 because	 one’s	 behavior	 is	dictated	 by	 the	 actor’s	 identity	 and	 corresponding	 interests.	 The	 research	 findings	substantiate	 the	 hypothesis,	 as	 the	 groups	 appear	 capable	 of	 constructing	 common	identities	and	persuading	adherents	to	help	diffuse	its	cause	and	carry	out	terrorist	attacks.	Moreover,	 sympathizers	 supported	 the	 ideals	 and	 brands	 promoted	 by	 the	 groups,	acknowledging	the	sources	of	soft	power.		
A	 limitation	 of	 the	 research	 is	 the	 generalizability	 of	 the	 results	 to	 additional	 terrorist	organizations.	 Although	 AQIM	 was	 selected	 to	 transfer	 the	 findings	 to	 other	 al-Qaeda	affiliates	and	geographically	concentrated	organizations,	it	is	likely	that	discrepancies	in	the	capabilities	 of	 varying	 jihadist	 groups	 exist.	 For	 example,	AQIM’s	digital	 public	 diplomacy	presence,	particularly	 in	comparison	to	 ISIS,	 is	 limited	despite	recent	efforts	 to	expand	 its	
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influence	 via	 social	 media.	 In	 comparison,	 al-Shabaab	 has	 extensively	 incorporated	 the	potential	of	online	platforms	in	its	public	diplomacy	campaign	and	proved	capable	of	using	tactics	 similar	 to	 ISIS.	 During	 the	 2013	 attack	 on	 Westgate	 Mall	 in	 Nairobi,	 Kenya,	 al-Shabaab	live-tweeted	throughout	the	ongoing	operation	and	uploaded	photos.	Additionally,	al-Shabaab	 appears	 to	 use	 technological	 innovations	 to	 contact	 an	 international	 audience	(Mair,	 2016:	 2).	 The	 example	 illustrates	 that	 no	 organization	 is	 entirely	 the	 same	 and	although	 similarities	 may	 exist	 in	 groups	 with	 comparable	 organizational	 makeup,	 the	public	diplomacy	strategies	and	capabilities	may	differ.	Therefore,	it	is	suggested	that	future	research	 extends	 the	 public	 diplomacy	 analysis	 of	 non-state	 actors	 to	 promote	 Islamic	fundamentalism	to	a	wider	array	of	terrorist	organizations.		
9 . 	 C o n c l u s i o n 	Through	investigating	the	strategies	utilized	by	the	non-state	actors	to	disseminate	Islamic	fundamentalist	values	and	mobilize	foreign	support,	the	thesis	revealed	that	current	public	diplomacy	thinking	must	be	upgraded	to	incorporate	jihadist	organizations.	At	first	glance,	the	methods	of	extremist	militant	groups	to	interact	with	external	societies	do	not	appear	to	qualify	 as	 public	 diplomacy,	 particularly	 due	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 foreign	 public-government	 nexus.	 Prior	 to	 the	 tactical	 use	 of	 social	 media	 to	 converse	 with	 distant	audiences,	 terrorist	 groups	 mainly	 relied	 on	 direct	 communication	 to	 recruit	 support,	thereby	 constricting	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 public	 diplomacy.	 Moreover,	 efforts	 to	 broaden	 the	zone	 of	 influence	 were	 frequently	 disregarded	 as	 propaganda,	 accounting	 for	 the	nonexistence	of	previous	research	on	the	topic	at	hand.	Consequently,	by	modifying	Gilboa’s	non-state	actor	model,	the	thesis	filled	the	knowledge	gap	and	redefined	public	diplomacy	thinking	 to	 include	 a	 new	 category	 of	 non-state	 actors:	 terrorist	 organizations.	 The	expansion	of	the	public	diplomacy	paradigm	to	encompass	jihadist	groups	opens	the	field	to	innovative	discussions.	Furthermore,	by	achieving	a	better	understanding	of	how	non-state	actors	 use	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 promote	 Islamic	 fundamentalist	 values	 and	 mobilize	support,	 decision	 makers	 are	 able	 to	 initiate	 more	 informed	 counterterrorist	 policy	responses.		
Through	 the	 application	 of	 the	 updated	 public	 diplomacy	 model	 in	 combination	 with	constructivism	to	inherently	dissimilar	jihadist	groups,	the	thesis	illustrated	how	non-state	actors	use	the	instrument	to	attract	foreign	support,	whilst	simultaneously	juxtaposing	the	
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variances	 in	capabilities.	The	results	 indicate	 that	 internationalized	organizations	 like	 ISIS	aspire	to	engage	with	a	wider,	global	audience.	Contrarily,	their	regional	counterparts	tend	to	 focus	 on	 populations	 in	 their	 direct	 neighborhood.	 Both	 actors	 tailor	 the	 underlying	brand	promoted	 to	 the	needs	of	 the	 intended	public	diplomacy	 recipients.	 ISIS	 fulfills	 the	desires	of	companionship	and	offers	a	place	of	belonging,	whilst	AQIM	addresses	the	African	frustrations	on	topics	ranging	from	poverty	to	resource	exploitation	by	Western	companies	and	 corrupt	 governments.	 The	 narratives	 of	 both	 actors	 aim	 to	 capture	 the	 attention	 of	potential	 sympathizers	 and	would-be	 recruits,	 persuading	 them	 to	 instigate	 contact	 with	group	 adherents,	 either	 through	 personal	 connections	 or	 social	 media	 platforms.	 Once	contact	is	established,	the	subjects	undergo	a	process	of	socialization,	in	which	the	existing	identity	 is	broken	down	and	replaced	with	a	new	socially	 constructed	reality	 centered	on	the	Islamic	fundamentalist	ideology.		
Despite	 both	 ISIS	 and	 AQIM	 exerting	 public	 diplomacy	 to	 mobilize	 foreign	 support,	 the	strategy	 implemented	 varies.	 ISIS	 launches	 a	 sophisticated	 digital	 public	 diplomacy	campaign,	by	disseminating	high-quality	productions	in	multiple	languages	on	social	media	websites	and	using	interactive	platforms	to	shape	the	respondent	in	accordance	to	radical	Islamism.	 ISIS,	 like	 AQIM,	 also	 promotes	 its	 values	 and	 recruits	 sympathizers	 through	personal	 connections	 and	 terrorist	 hotbeds.	 However,	 it	 is	 the	 extensive	 online	 network	that	 offers	 the	 organization	 the	 possibility	 of	 mobilizing	 supporters	 and	 establishing	collective	 identities	 with	 populations	 thousands	 of	 kilometers	 away.	 Alternatively,	 AQIM	primarily	relies	on	direct	contact	with	its	intended	audience	to	promote	its	radical	ideology	and	 integrates	 into	 local	 communities	 to	 generate	 the	 intersubjective	 understanding	 as	allies.	 Although	AQIM	 recently	 advanced	 its	 online	 presence,	most	 likely	 to	 compete	with	ISIS	 for	 influence	 in	 the	 region,	 the	 use	 of	 social	 media	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 core	component	 of	 its	 public	 diplomacy.	 The	 images	 and	 videos	 dispersed	 on	 Twitter	 and	Telegram	are	almost	entirely	 in	Arabic,	 indicating	 the	use	of	social	media	 likely	aspires	 to	reach	Diasporas	rather	 than	a	broad,	global	audience.	Moreover,	 the	meager	use	of	online	platforms	 insinuates	 that	 AQIM’s	 prime	 public	 diplomacy	 recipients	 are	 impoverished,	regional	 populations	 with	 limited	 access	 to	 the	 Internet.	 In	 other	 words,	 AQIM	 exerts	 a	‘glocal’	 public	 diplomacy,	 directed	 at	 mobilizing	 support	 of	 populations	 residing	 in	 the	region,	 whilst	 fighting	 the	 near	 and	 far	 enemy	 by	 strategically	 targeting	 internationally	relevant	sites.	 In	contrast,	 the	public	diplomacy	 implemented	by	 ISIS	endeavors	 to	attract	support	from	all	corners	of	the	world	and	wage	jihad	outside	its	mandated	territory.			
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To	 conclude,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 interaction	 with	 targeted	 foreign	 populations	 is	conducted	 with	 assistance	 of	 advanced	 technology	 or	 direct	 people-to-people	 diplomacy,	both	 strategies	 facilitate	 the	 installation	 of	 the	 group’s	 norms	 and	 values	 and	 foster	 the	development	 of	 a	 shared	 identity.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 modern	 use	 of	 social	 media	dramatically	 strengthens	 the	 capabilities	 of	 public	 diplomacy,	 placing	 ISIS	 in	 a	 superior	position.		
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